Open PDF in Browser: Sebastian Blitt,* The Hub-And-Spoke Model: How Everyone Can Get In On The Action In Colorado
Since sports betting became legal in Colorado in 2020, state‑licensed casinos have been able to offer online sportsbooks which allow residents to make wagers from anywhere in the state. The convenience of mobile wagering has led to a boom in the popularity of sports betting, with billions wagered since legalization. However, state‑licensed casinos are not the only entities that can offer gaming in Colorado. Two Native nations, the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute, are also authorized to offer sports betting. Yet, unlike state‑licensed casinos, tribal casinos are subject to limitations placed on them by gaming compacts negotiated with Colorado. These compacts, which were last updated in the mid‑1990s, provide that tribal casinos can only offer gaming in “Indian Country.”[1] Under current legal interpretations of this provision, tribal casinos are prevented from accepting bets placed remotely by patrons located within Colorado but outside of tribal land. Therefore, these two tribes have been left out of the mobile sports betting market completely, resulting in a substantial competitive disadvantage and lost revenue.
This Note discusses the history of federal, state, and tribal law that has culminated in this result. This Note then advocates that Colorado amend its gaming compacts to include the hub‑and‑spoke model, which deems that a bet occurs at the location of the servers where it is accepted. By adopting this model, the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute will be able to participate in the sports betting market in Colorado.
Introduction
In February of 2020, a Colorado resident who wanted to legally bet on the Super Bowl would have needed to board a plane bound for Las Vegas.[2] Only a few months later, that same person could wager on which team would win the NBA Championship from the comfort of their couch in Boulder. The opportunity to place bets on sporting events in Colorado was made possible when voters passed Proposition DD in 2019,[3] paving the way for sportsbooks to become operational in the summer of 2020.[4] Importantly, Proposition DD not only made it legal to bet on sports at retail locations,[5] but state‑licensed casinos[6] were also authorized to accept bets placed through online sportsbooks.[7] With betting markets officially open and easily accessible to adults across Colorado, almost anyone could “get in on the action”[8] during a Nuggets game on Tuesday or a Buffaloes game on Saturday without needing to make a trip to the nearest casino, let alone Nevada.
Proposition DD would not have been placed in front of Colorado voters without a landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2018.[9] For nearly three decades, Congress prohibited most states, including Colorado, from legalizing sports betting through a federal law called the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).[10] However, the federal freeze on sports betting ended following the decision in Murphy v. NCAA, when the Supreme Court struck down PASPA as unconstitutionally violating the Tenth Amendment.[11] With federal barriers removed, states across the country—Colorado included—rushed to pass their own legislation permitting sports betting. As of December 2024, thirty‑eight states and Washington, D.C., have legalized some form of sports betting.[12] Thirty states allow online sports betting.[13] For residents living in one of these jurisdictions, sports betting has never been more accessible, evidenced by the fact that Americans have wagered over $220 billion in the wake of Murphy.[14]
After voters passed Proposition DD, state‑licensed casinos quickly provided Colorado residents with their choice of many online platforms, accessible via websites and mobile applications, from which to place bets. In December 2024, thirteen different companies were licensed to operate an online sportsbook.[15] This form of gaming quickly proved to be immensely popular with consumers, shown by the more than $13 billion Coloradans wagered in the first three years of legal sports betting.[16] The state itself benefits greatly, as sports betting is generating upwards of $20 million dollars in tax revenue per year.[17] Of course, casinos reap their own rewards, earning tens of millions of dollars in gross gaming revenues per month.[18] With Colorado residents able to easily make bets and the state collecting millions in tax revenue, the proliferation of sports betting has been an enormous economic success.
Unfortunately, the boom in online sports betting in Colorado is missing two important players: the Southern Ute[19] and Ute Mountain Ute.[20] As federally recognized tribes that have been authorized by Colorado to conduct gaming,[21] both the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute can offer retail sportsbooks in their casinos.[22] Despite this ability, tribal leadership addressed the Colorado legislature in January 2023, seeking authorization to enter the online sports betting market.[23] State law currently dictates that remote betting takes place at the location of the bettor rather than the location of the physical server through which it is accepted.[24] Taking this view means that mobile bets placed outside of tribal land do not occur in “Indian Country,” preventing tribal casinos from accepting such bets pursuant to their current gaming compacts.[25] Colorado officials have further tried to require the tribes obtain state licensure to offer online sports betting—even though other forms of tribal gaming are not subject to state regulation—a position the tribes view as infringing on their sovereignty.[26]
It is hard to overstate the significance of the competitive disadvantage tribal casinos face because of their exclusion in the online sports betting market. Between May 2020 and April 2023, 99 percent of sports wagers in Colorado were placed online.[27] Across the industry, online gaming, including sports betting, accounted for 30 percent of casino revenues in November 2023 alone.[28] Casinos provide one of the main revenue sources for tribal activities, making the lost potential revenue from online sports betting extremely damaging to the economic and governmental interests of the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes.[29]
The tension caused by the tribes’ exclusion from the online betting market came to a head in July 2024, when the Southern Ute Tribe sued both Governor Polis and the Director of the Colorado Division of Gaming in federal court.[30] The Southern Ute, along with the Ute Mountain Ute, which has since joined the lawsuit,[31] are seeking a declaratory judgment that offering an online betting platform is compliant with existing law and injunctive relief, preventing Colorado officials from interfering with the tribes’ mobile sports betting offerings.[32] The fact that the tribes were forced to resort to litigation makes the pressing need for a solution crystal clear.[33]
This Note focuses on the current legal landscape in Colorado that prevents the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute from offering mobile sports betting and the potential remedies that would allow them to gain footing in this market. This Note ultimately concludes that allowing these tribes to offer remote sports betting is best achieved by adopting the hub‑and‑spoke model,[34] which would deem that remote bets—those initiated outside of tribal land but within Colorado’s borders—are placed on tribal land so long as the physical server accepting the bet is located there. To reach this conclusion, Part I first provides a background on the rise and fall of federal regulation of sports betting, which paved the way for Colorado to legalize this form of gaming. Part II describes the history of tribal gaming law, laying the groundwork for the current legal landscape that applies to the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute. Part III discusses the legalization of sports betting in Colorado and the compacts that govern the gaming activities offered by the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute. Part IV examines the models that other states have used to allow Native nations within their borders to offer mobile gaming. Finally, Part V proposes that Colorado adopt the hub‑and‑spoke model to allow the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute to offer mobile sports betting and advocates for federal action to provide similar access to mobile sports betting for Native nations across the country.
I. Federal Regulation of Sports Betting
Although many states have now legalized sports betting, the option of permitting this form of gambling is a relatively new one. First, Section I.A will describe the history of federal legislation building up to PASPA, which nixed legal sports betting in almost every state. Then, Section I.B describes the efforts of state officials who wished to offer sports betting, resulting in a series of legal challenges against PASPA. These challenges culminated in Murphy, a Supreme Court decision which removed the federal barriers preventing states from legalizing sports betting.[35] This ruling ultimately paved the way for the betting market that exists in Colorado today.
A. The Rise of Federal Regulation of Sports Betting: The Road to PASPA
Congressional interest in regulating sports betting can be traced back to the 1950s.[36] Around that time, Congress, concerned with the proliferation of organized crime, established the Kefauver Committee, which was tasked with identifying how organized crime groups operated and developing solutions to stifle such groups.[37] In its findings, the committee established that gambling, and specifically bookmaking,[38] was the primary source of revenue for organized crime.[39] Based on this determination, the committee recommended legislative action aimed at stopping crime groups from operating sportsbooks in interstate commerce.[40] In 1961, Congress implemented this recommendation by passing the Wire Act, the first statute explicitly targeting interstate sports betting.[41] The Wire Act provided that a person who “knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest” can be fined or imprisoned.[42] That Act was the first in a series of bills passed throughout the 1960s as Congress set its sights on criminalizing gambling activities used by organized crime.[43] These efforts included the Travel Act,[44] the Wagering Paraphernalia Act,[45] the Sports Bribery Act,[46] and the Illegal Gambling Business Act.[47]
Those laws remained the principal sources of sports betting legislation until the 1990s, when the interests of those wishing to proscribe sports betting came in direct conflict with the growing number of people wishing to expand it. At that time, professional and collegiate sports leagues became concerned that betting could lead to corruption, threatening the integrity of their respective sports.[48] That concern became particularly urgent following the prosecution of members in an organized crime group for bribing players on the Boston College men’s basketball team in a points‑shaving scheme.[49] In addition to those voicing concerns about the integrity of sports, others were worried that sports betting would lead to a rise in gambling addiction.[50] Yet, even with these looming threats, many states were considering adding sports betting to their lotteries. Officials in those states were enticed by the large consumer appetite for sports betting, which carried with it a large and untapped tax base.[51] Despite congressional efforts to curb illegal sports betting, some reports estimated that more than $29.5 billion was wagered illegally in 1989 alone.[52] Facing the potential of widespread state legislation authorizing sports gambling, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) in 1992.[53]
PASPA made it unlawful for any governmental entity[54] or person to
sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances of such athletes in such games.[55]
With the passage of PASPA, Congress effectively preempted any new state legislation legalizing sports betting in states or localities which did not already offer it.[56] As the only state offering sportsbook‑style wagering at the time of the “freeze,” PASPA had the practical effect of giving Nevada a monopoly over the activity.[57] Meanwhile, other governments, including Colorado and Native nations, were left out of the market entirely.[58]
Although PASPA prevented legitimate, state‑sponsored gambling, it was unable to deter the illegal gambling market emerging on the internet.[59] The combination of foreclosed legal opportunities and rapidly developing technology created a thriving illegal online sports betting market in the late 1990s and early 2000s.[60] One report in 1999 indicated that U.S. bettors wagered between $80 and $380 billion each year using unregulated—and untaxed—online sports betting platforms.[61] This frustrated state officials, who faced challenges regulating online gambling, which often crossed state or even international borders.[62] Congress, citing its own concerns about debt collection problems stemming from online gaming and the lack of effectiveness of traditional regulatory mechanisms,[63] attempted to curb online gambling in 2006 with the passage of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA).[64] The UIGEA imposes criminal penalties for accepting, processing, or facilitating money transfers for internet gambling if a wager is placed or received in a location where such gambling is unlawful under the applicable federal, state, or tribal law.[65] The law also allowed state and federal authorities to seek injunctions to stop such payments from being made.[66] However, this legislation was narrow in scope and generally unsuccessful in stifling the burgeoning online sports betting market.[67]
Despite the concerns evinced by Congress, many individuals, businesses, and state officials remained dissatisfied with their inability to participate in, offer, or collect tax revenue from sports betting.[68] In response to this dissatisfaction, different groups brought a series of legal challenges to the validity of PASPA. The next Section will outline these challenges, which ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy, paving the way for sports betting to grow in states across the country.
B. The Fall of Federal Regulation of Sports Betting: Overturning PASPA
Motivated by their own desires, individuals, businesses, and states set their sights on chipping away at the PASPA regulatory regime. These efforts spurred litigation across five cases, which can be classified in one of two categories.[69] In the first category, individuals seeking to place bets and private businesses wanting to offer bets brought constitutional challenges to PASPA under the Tenth Amendment. These cases were ultimately unsuccessful due to lack of standing. The second category of cases were those brought by professional sports leagues in response to states attempting to legalize sports betting. In those cases, the leagues sought to enforce PASPA by enjoining new state legislation permitting sportsbook‑style wagering.[70] While the leagues were initially successful in upholding the provisions of PASPA, the states ultimately won the day when the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Murphy.
The first crack at invalidating PASPA came in 2007. In Flagler v. United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, a New Jersey man who was unable to legally bet filed a complaint alleging that PASPA unconstitutionally violated the Tenth Amendment.[71] The plaintiff argued that Congress could not dictate whether individual states could allow gambling.[72] The District Court of New Jersey dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing for failure to show a legally protected right, a concrete and particularized injury, and redressability.[73]
Following that unsuccessful attempt, a corporation wanting to offer betting brought a claim in 2011. In Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Association v. Holder, an electronic gaming company and three New Jersey horsemen’s associations[74] brought another Tenth Amendment challenge to PASPA.[75] To differentiate this case from the failed attempt in Flagler, these plaintiffs claimed a more particularized injury: They wanted to offer sports betting but were unable.[76] Despite this effort, the district court once again dismissed the case for lack of standing, reasoning that only a state could challenge PASPA on Tenth Amendment grounds.[77]
With individuals and entities failing to topple PASPA, states took matters into their own hands by trying to legalize sports betting. Delaware stepped up to the plate first when its governor attempted to authorize sports gambling in 2009.[78] In Office of the Commissioner of Baseball v. Markell, five American sports leagues filed for an injunction to prevent this proposed legislation.[79] Under PASPA’s legacy clause,[80] Delaware was allowed to retain the limited sports lotteries it had previously offered, but the legislation at issue would have allowed licensed casinos to offer sportsbooks.[81] With past scandals in mind, and motivated by the fear that sportsbooks could lead to corruption, the leagues sought to enjoin the legislation from taking effect.[82] Agreeing with the leagues, the Third Circuit held that although Delaware’s lottery system was preserved, the proposed legislation expanded the gambling activities beyond the scope of the legacy exception and thus violated PASPA.[83]
New Jersey was the next in line when it sought to enact the Sports Wagering Law, which would similarly allow casinos to obtain state licenses permitting them to offer sports betting.[84] Unlike Delaware, New Jersey had no form of sports betting in place when PASPA was enacted, making it an entirely new form of gaming in the state.[85] In NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, sports leagues once again brought a legal challenge, alleging that New Jersey’s proposed law would violate PASPA.[86] In response, New Jersey argued that PASPA was unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment.[87] Unlike the previous Tenth Amendment challenges brought by individuals and businesses, the District Court of New Jersey found that the state had standing to bring a constitutional challenge.[88] However, despite reaching the merits of this claim, on appeal the Third Circuit concluded that PASPA did not violate the anti‑commandeering doctrine.[89] Specifically, the court determined that PASPA was not commanding the states to enact or carry out a federal scheme, distinguishing it from the only two previous laws that had been invalidated under the anti‑commandeering principle.[90] With that, New Jersey was unable to legalize sports betting, at least for the time being.
Although this decision nixed the Sports Wagering Law, the appellate court did provide two glimmers of hope that New Jersey officials would later capitalize on. First, in dicta, the court made a point to distinguish legalizing sports betting—which New Jersey was attempting to do with the Sports Wagering Law—from repealing a ban on gambling, explicitly saying, “we do not read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from repealing its ban on sports wagering.”[91] Second, one dissenting judge, agreeing with the argument articulated in favor of allowing New Jersey to legalize sports betting, said that “[b]y prohibiting states from licensing or authorizing sports gambling, PASPA dictates the manner in which states must regulate interstate commerce and thus contravenes the principles of federalism.”[92] The dissenting judge distinguished between Congress regulating sports betting itself, which it could certainly do under the Commerce Clause, and PASPA, which regulated the individual states’ ability to manage sports betting.[93]
Capitalizing on the window left open by the Third Circuit, New Jersey legislators adopted a new approach: drafting a partial repeal of laws prohibiting sports betting rather than passing a law affirmatively allowing it.[94] With the same league integrity concerns in mind, sports leagues challenged the legislation as expected.[95] Unconvinced that repealing a ban on sports betting was meaningfully different from legalizing it, both the district and appellate courts erred on the side of precedent and held that the proposed repeal nonetheless violated PASPA.[96] Hoping to resolve the issue once and for all, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutionality of the federal law.[97] In Murphy v. NCAA, the Court examined section 3702(1), which prevented governmental entities from offering sports betting.[98] In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he PASPA provision at issue here—prohibiting state authorization of sports gambling—violates the anti‑commandeering rule. That provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do.”[99] To make the point clear, the Court held that “Congress can regulate sports gambling directly, but if it elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its own.”[100] A challenger had finally succeeded in invalidating PASPA and, in doing so, dismantled the federal barriers preventing states from regulating sports betting.
Many states, including Colorado, acted quickly to adopt sports betting regimes. However, the decision in Murphy did not necessarily permit Native nations to offer sports betting. The next Part explains that result by describing the history of Indian gaming law and introducing current regulations governing tribal gaming. It will soon become apparent that the lack of a federal solution forces tribes to conduct gaming based on negotiations with states through the key mechanism of Indian gaming regulation today: the “Tribal‑State” compact.[101] Whether tribes can accept mobile sports bets will ultimately rely on the text of such agreements.
II. Tribal Regulation of Sports Betting
Tribal gaming law, like many other areas of federal Indian law, has developed in a way that creates a unique regulatory relationship between federal, state, and tribal governments.[102] First, Section II.A briefly introduces federal Indian policy to provide a general backdrop behind the specific issues this Note raises. Then, Section II.B outlines the growth of modern tribal gaming and the corresponding efforts by the federal and state governments to gain regulatory control over it. These efforts ultimately culminated in the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), a federal law that sought to balance both tribal and state interests in managing gaming.[103] Section II.C describes the regulatory scheme created by IGRA—namely the requirement that Native nations negotiate with states to create compacts allowing gaming to take place on tribal land. Finally, Section II.D outlines how the implementation of many Tribal‑State compacts creates barriers preventing many Native nations from offering mobile gaming.
A. A Brief Introduction to Federal Indian Policy & Tribal Self‑Determination
The focus of this Note is on the intricacies of Indian gaming law in the context of sports betting. However, gaming law is merely one component of a long, complex, and difficult history of federal Indian policy.[104] While a full discussion of federal Indian policy is beyond the scope of this Note, providing some context on current policy helps frame the issues and contextualizes the solutions offered in Part V.
Following the devastating effects of the “Termination Era” and corresponding efforts made by Native rights advocacy groups,[105] the Nixon Administration and Congress set federal Indian policy to one of “self‑determination” in 1970.[106] This policy, effectuated through various legislative acts,[107] was intended to increase tribal self‑governance by acknowledging Native nations’ rights to operate and administer services and programs which had previously been provided solely by the United States.[108] Furthermore, Congress provided Native nations with programs designed to increase economic development.[109] As part of self‑determination, the relationship between the United States and Native nations was cemented as one between two governments, with tribal governments recognized as sovereign.[110] This stated federal policy has been carried forward by more recent administrations, including President Clinton[111] and President Obama.[112]
Within the framework of self‑determination, the operation of tribal casinos should be seen as an exercise of sovereignty.[113] Per the National Congress of American Indians, “[t]he essence of tribal sovereignty is the ability to govern and to protect and enhance the health, safety, and welfare of tribal citizens.”[114] To accomplish this, “[t]ribal nations are striving to achieve economic stability and self‑sufficiency and are using the tools of self‑governance to build sustained prosperity for reservations and surrounding communities.”[115] Gaming is one popular means by which many tribes pursue these ends.[116]
However, as discussed in Section II.C below, states have significant power over tribal gaming under current law.[117] This creates what Steven Andrew Light and Kathryn R.L. Rand call “the paradox” of tribal sovereignty in Indian gaming law.[118] On one hand, tribal governments may seek to open a casino to promote economic development, but on the other hand, they must submit to increased state regulation in order to do so.[119] As a result of this paradox, states play a critical role in tribal governance, as any increase in state regulation likely represents a corresponding decrease in tribal sovereignty. In this way, even though Native nations are recognized as sovereign, their treatment in the context of sports betting is starkly different to that of the states, which can now legislate over sports betting largely unrestrained by the federal government.[120]
Thus, although self‑determination is federal policy, this Note advocates that Colorado officials should strive to minimize the paradox and exercise their significant regulatory powers over gaming to promote tribal sovereignty.[121] With this background in mind, the next Section describes the history of tribal gaming development and demonstrates how this industry has been subject to ongoing tension between tribal sovereignty and state regulatory pressures.
B. History and Development of Tribal Gaming Law
The beginning of modern tribal gaming can be traced back to Richard Sosseur, a citizen of the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, who petitioned for and received a gaming license from the Lac du Flambeau Band Tribal Council.[122] Sosseur installed nine slot machines on properties he owned within the Reservation.[123] In doing so, Sosseur relied in part on the presumption that Wisconsin law, which outlawed gambling, did not apply to him on tribal lands.[124] However, Sosseur was later indicted—and ultimately convicted—under the Assimilative Crimes Act, a federal law that allowed state law to govern conduct occurring on certain federal land, including tribal lands, if Congress had not otherwise defined the offense.[125] Specifically, Sosseur was charged with operating slot machines that “furnished the means by which non‑Indians were enabled and induced to violate the Wisconsin law.”[126] The ruling dealt the first blow to the ability of Native nations to operate facilities on their reservations without interference from federal or state authorities.
Shortly after that decision in 1950, which took place around the same time as the Kefauver Committee and Congress’s general interest in suppressing gambling,[127] Congress took action to further limit the development of the gaming industry on tribal land by passing the Johnson Act.[128] That Act provided that “[i]t shall be unlawful to manufacture, recondition, repair, sell, transport, possess, or use any gambling device in the District of Columbia, in any possession of the United States, [and] within Indian country.”[129] The Johnson Act also outlawed transporting any gambling device into a state but carved out an exception allowing states to enact laws exempting themselves from the Act.[130] There was no corresponding “opt‑out” provision in the section of the statute applying to Native nations, meaning gambling devices could not be transported onto tribal land even if authorized by tribal law.[131] This discrepancy had the effect of allowing states to offer gambling if they chose while entirely excluding Native nations from doing the same.[132]
Even with the limits placed on tribal gaming, Native nations and gaming device manufacturers continued to seek ways to capitalize on the burgeoning gambling market.[133] In 1977, members of the Puyallup Indian Tribe opened a casino on their Reservation and offered a variety of games that could be played without the particular gambling machines outlawed in the Johnson Act.[134] Nonetheless, the operators of the casino were indicted under federal law, this time under the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA).[135] In 1980, the Ninth Circuit held that the OCCA applied in Indian Country, stating “We find that Congress did not intend that Indians could freely engage in the large‑scale gambling businesses that it forbade to all other citizens.”[136] With this decision, it became clear that federal law could shut down almost all tribal gaming operations.[137]
Despite the apparent ability to stifle tribal gaming, federal prosecutions under the OCCA were pursued sparingly, potentially due to the shift in federal policy toward self‑determination[138] and the recognition that gaming helped to fund tribal governments, relieving the federal government from having to provide some social services.[139] At this time, Native nations in both Florida and California started to operate high stakes bingo,[140] a form of gaming that also could be played without the devices prohibited under the Johnson Act.[141] Given the hesitation of federal prosecutors, state officials sought to enforce state and local gaming laws in Indian Country.[142]
Recognizing the potential for state interference, the Seminole Tribe filed for and was granted a preliminary injunction in conjunction with opening a bingo hall in 1979, preventing state officials from enforcing Florida gaming laws.[143] When Florida officials appealed the injunction, the Fifth Circuit held that “[w]here the state regulates the operation of bingo halls to prevent the game of bingo from becoming a money‑making business, the Seminole Indian [T]ribe is not subject to that regulation and cannot be prosecuted for violating the limitations imposed.”[144] In deciding that Florida’s bingo laws could not be enforced against the tribe, the court relied on the fact that the Florida law was regulatory, not prohibitory, and that bingo was not against public policy because it was authorized by state law in certain instances.[145] This decision helped to pave the way for Native nations across the country to venture into the bingo business. Many nations took advantage of this ruling, shown by the fact that there were 180 bingo halls open in Indian Country by 1983.[146]
Around the same time, the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians opened gaming facilities on their Reservations in California.[147] Building on previous success, the tribes sought a preliminary injunction preventing state officials from enforcing local ordinances.[148] Opposing this injunction, California state officials sought to force the tribes to comply with a state criminal law that prevented anyone other than charitable organizations from offering bingo.[149] Riverside County officials joined the opposition, seeking to apply their own local ordinances regulating bingo.[150] The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, where the Court applied a similar analysis to that of the Fifth Circuit in determining that California’s laws were regulatory and not prohibitory.[151] Therefore, the Court concluded that California could not enforce its laws on the Cabazon and Morongo Reservations.[152] The Cabazon decision seemed to bolster hopes of continued development of gaming in Indian Country without interference from the states.[153] After Cabazon, states would have to prohibit individual gaming activities, such as bingo, entirely in order to prevent the same activities from being conducted on tribal land under tribal law.[154] Otherwise, state gaming law was unenforceable, at least for the time being.[155]
Having faced a setback in court but still seeking a way to regulate Indian gaming within state borders, state and local officials began to pressure Congress to legislate on this issue.[156] Congress began considering various forms of legislation, ultimately culminating in IGRA. That Act would have the practical effect of forcing Native nations to negotiate with states in order to offer many forms of gambling, including sports betting.
C. IGRA and Tribal‑State Compacts
As Congress started considering bills to regulate tribal gaming as early as 1983,[157] an ideological divide soon materialized regarding the role that state law should play.[158] Two bills emerged in the summer of 1987 that demonstrated the spectrum of regulatory possibilities.[159] One proposal largely reflected the interests of state officials wanting to increase their power over tribal gaming operations.[160] That bill would have made certain types of gaming illegal in Indian Country unless a Native nation agreed to transfer jurisdiction over gaming activities to the state.[161] On the other end, a second proposal was more favorable to tribal interests insofar as it kept states from meddling in tribal affairs.[162] That bill would have given regulatory authority to the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), a federal body that would license tribal casinos and enforce a regulatory scheme without direct interference from the states.[163]
In 1988, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs was able to work out a compromise between these two factions in what became Senate Bill 555.[164] In a report, the Committee identified “[t]he mechanism for facilitating the unusual relationship in which a [T]ribe might affirmatively seek the extension of State jurisdiction and the application of state laws to activities conducted on Indian land is a [T]ribal‑State compact.”[165] Basically, rather than having state enforcement automatically, Native nations and states would work out how reservation gaming would be regulated on an individualized basis through compact negotiations.[166] The report also specified that under this model, the use of compacts “does not contemplate and does not provide for the conduct of class III gaming activities on Indian lands in the absen[c]e of a [T]ribal‑State compact.”[167] As a result of this understanding, Native nations would necessarily be reliant on the ability to negotiate with states in order to conduct most gaming activities.[168]
Recognizing that tethering the ability for Native nations to conduct gaming activities on negotiations with states created the potential for a power imbalance, the Committee emphasized the need to create incentives for states to negotiate in good faith.[169] Without the proper incentives, states could pressure Native nations in compact negotiations backed by the credible threat of preventing them from offering gaming at all.[170] To address this, the Committee included a provision that allowed Native nations to sue a state for negotiating in bad faith.[171] While this version of the bill passed in October of 1988, the Supreme Court later invalidated the provision allowing tribes to sue states after finding that it unconstitutionally abrogated states’ sovereign immunity.[172] Nonetheless, the remaining sections of the bill, now known as IGRA, remain in effect.[173]
The IGRA breaks gaming activities into three classes, each of which provide for a different allocation of power between federal, state, and tribal governments.[174] Class I games are those played for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of gaming played in connection with ceremonies or celebrations.[175] Class I gaming activities are “within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian [T]ribes and shall not be subject to the [IGRA].”[176] Class II gaming activities include bingo and certain card games.[177] Class II gaming activities “shall continue to be within the jurisdiction of the Indian [T]ribes, but shall be subject to the [IGRA].”[178] Class III gaming activities include all those not included in Class I and II.[179] Native nations can offer Class III games only if such activities are (1) authorized by tribal ordinance or resolution, (2) located in a state that permits the gaming activity, and (3) conducted in conformity with a Tribal‑State compact.[180] The IGRA also created the NIGC,[181] which is responsible for reviewing and approving tribal gaming ordinances, overseeing the federal regulation of Indian gaming operations, and enforcing violations of the IGRA.[182]
Sports betting is included in the IGRA’s definition of Class III gaming.[183] Therefore, to be eligible to offer sports betting, a Native nation must first be located within a state that has legalized it. Then, sports betting would need to be approved through a tribal ordinance, which must be approved by the NIGC Commissioner.[184] If these two conditions were met, a Native nation would further be required to enter into negotiations with a state to conduct sports betting through a Tribal‑State compact.
Since the passage of the IGRA, more than 700 Tribal‑State compacts have been signed,[185] including two compacts between Colorado and the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute, respectively.[186] Importantly, the IGRA regulates the ability for Native nations to offer gambling on “Indian lands,”[187] which is defined within the Act as “all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation.”[188] The next Section of this Note will discuss how the rise of mobile sports betting has placed greater importance on this term, creating controversy over whether bets placed online take place in Indian Country.
D. Gaming “in Indian Country” and Mobile Sports Betting
With the expansion of mobile sports wagering, it is has become less clear whether a bet placed online has taken place “on Indian lands.” Generally, there are two ways to analyze where a mobile bet has occurred: (1) focusing on where a wager is physically placed, or (2) focusing on where a wager is accepted—which is typically defined as the physical location of the servers.[189] In the early 2000s, the NIGC issued a guidance letter that provided that “the use of the Internet, even though the computer server may be located on Indian lands, would constitute off‑reservation gaming to the extent any of the players were located off of Indian lands.”[190] Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice has also expressed its view that gamblers placing bets remotely from outside the physical boundaries of a reservation constitutes off‑reservation gaming.[191] Pursuant to these policies, bets are legally placed where the user is physically located, meaning that patrons must be present on tribal land to fall under the provisions of IGRA. Importantly, these policy decisions were articulated nearly two decades before Murphy and the proliferation of legal online sports betting.[192] As a result, tribes in jurisdictions applying these policies are constrained by rules made in an era where remote sports wagering was illegal, leaving them unable to accept bets their state‑licensed counterparts can.
The understanding that mobile bets are deemed to occur at the physical location of the bettor was reinforced in California v. Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel.[193] In that case, the Nation was offering Desert Rose Bingo, a Class II bingo game permitted on the Reservation but illegal in California.[194] The game was made available online to players throughout California via servers physically located on tribal land.[195] The Nation argued that, because the physical server equipment was located on tribal land, the gaming was conducted solely on Indian lands and therefore governed by the IGRA.[196] Under this logic, California law would be inapplicable.[197] The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the wagering took place in California where the bettors were located.[198] Because this form of gambling was illegal under California state law, the Nation had violated the provision of the UIGEA that outlaws accepting payments for gaming if the bettor is located where such gaming is illegal.[199] The court reasoned that the “patrons’ act of placing a bet or wager on a game of [Desert Rose Bingo] while located in California constitutes gaming activity that is not located on Indian lands . . . and is not protected by IGRA.”[200]
If online bets are deemed to occur outside of Indian land, making the IGRA inapplicable, then state law steps in.[201] Although sports betting is legal in Colorado, therefore avoiding any issues under the UIGEA, Colorado law requires casinos to be licensed to offer sports betting.[202] This creates uncertainty and risk for the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute, who are not licensed by Colorado,[203] and could therefore be classified as an unlicensed operator if they were to accept online bets.[204] In fact, this risk was realized in 2020, when the Southern Ute Tribe attempted to launch an online sportsbook following legalization of the activity in Colorado.[205] At that time, the Colorado Division of Gaming threatened to revoke the license of a third‑party gaming company that was working with the tribe to set up its mobile betting platform.[206] Simultaneously, the Division of Gaming demanded that the tribe obtain a state license.[207] The tribe ultimately closed down its app.[208] This dispute highlights that the gaming compacts between the tribes and Colorado have not been updated to explicitly reflect the modern, mobile nature of sports betting. The next Part will discuss the current legal landscape in Colorado which has led to this result.
III. The Sports Betting Landscape in Colorado
Colorado was one of the forty‑six states frozen out of sports betting under the PASPA regulatory regime.[209] However, within months of the Murphy decision overruling PASPA, Colorado legislators began contemplating the best way to legalize sports betting.[210] Ultimately, these legislative efforts neglected to take tribal gaming into account despite efforts by the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute to come to a mutual understanding with Colorado regarding sports betting.[211] The failure to respond to tribal concerns in time left the two existing gaming compacts between Colorado and the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute unmodified, excluding the tribes from the mobile market entirely. Section III.A will first discuss the legislative history and enactment of Proposition DD, which legalized sports betting in Colorado. Then, Section III.B will outline the current Tribal‑State compacts in place between Colorado and the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes, which govern the ability for these tribes to offer mobile sports betting today.
A. The Legalization of Sports Betting in Colorado: Proposition DD
Following the Supreme Court striking down PASPA, the gaming division of the Colorado Department of Revenue reached out to then Attorney General Cynthia Coffman for guidance on the best path forward for making sports betting legal in the state.[212] After analyzing the state of the law, Coffman released her opinion in August 2018 determining that “[n]ew legislation, but not a state constitutional amendment, would be required to authorize commercial sports betting in Colorado.”[213]
With this guidance in hand, two lawmakers introduced a bill in 2019 to legalize sports betting in Colorado.[214] The basic provisions of the proposed legislation allowed casinos to apply for a master license to operate both retail and online sports books.[215] Additionally, the bill authorized the state to collect a 10 percent tax on sports betting proceeds.[216] The tax generated from sports betting is spent first on regulating the activity, with any remainder allocated to the Water Plan Implementation Cash Fund, which is used to fund state water projects pursuant to the State Water Plan.[217] Although the bill cleared both the state senate and house, this was merely the first hurdle on a long road of bringing sports betting to Colorado.[218]
In Colorado, a constitutional amendment called the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR) gives voters the ultimate right to approve or deny any new statewide tax.[219] As a result of TABOR, Colorado voters were required to approve the sports betting legislation because of the proposed tax on gambling revenues.[220] In order to meet this constitutional requirement, Proposition DD was placed onto the ballot in November 2019,[221] asking voters if “sports betting will be legal and taxed in the state.”[222] Specifically, Proposition DD made it legal for people twenty‑one years and older and located in Colorado to place sports bets in person where casino gambling is legal[223] and online through platforms operated by “Colorado casinos.”[224] Following the passage of Proposition DD,[225] Colorado became the nineteenth state to legalize sports betting.[226]
Once sports betting was legalized, all state‑licensed casinos could obtain a master license, allowing each casino to offer sports betting in person and to operate one online platform.[227] Importantly, customers were allowed to place bets online from anywhere in the state without needing to be present in a casino,[228] making online betting an attractive and convenient option that quickly captured the majority of the market share. However, tribal casinos, which are not licensed by Colorado but rather by their own individual tribal gaming commission, do not have master licenses to offer online sports betting.[229]
The first legal sports bet was placed in May 2020.[230] During that month, bettors wagered over $25 million, resulting in $97,000 in state tax revenue.[231] Colorado bettors wagered $2.3 billion during the first year post‑legalization.[232] From May 2020 through April 2023, sports betting provided the state with almost $44 million in tax revenue.[233] Estimates show that tax revenue from sports betting reached approximately $30 million in the 2023–2024 fiscal year, a number which is only expected to rise in future years.[234] Even more staggering than these figures is the proportion of wagers made through online platforms. Approximately 80 percent of the bets made in the first year were made on mobile platforms.[235] In the first three years of legalized sports betting, 99 percent of the gross gaming revenue was sourced from online bets.[236] These figures not only demonstrate how valuable sports betting has become in Colorado, but highlight the importance of offering a mobile platform. While casinos licensed to operate mobile sports betting platforms have been given an opportunity to cash in on the lucrative sports betting market, the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute have been restrained by their respective compacts, which retain the requirement that sports bets be placed on their Reservations.[237]
B. Tribal Gaming Compacts in Colorado
The Southern Ute gaming compact with Colorado went into effect in 1995[238] and continues in perpetuity.[239] Under the Southern Ute compact, the tribe is authorized to offer “Class III Games that, subsequent to the effective date of this Compact, are [e]xplicitly [a]uthorized by the laws of the State.”[240] The Ute Mountain Ute compact went into effect in 1996[241] and continues in perpetuity.[242] Similarly, the Ute Mountain Ute compact allows the tribe to offer “any or all Class III gaming that is permitted within the State for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity, now or hereafter.”[243] Therefore, even though the compacts were signed in 1995 and 1996, both tribes were automatically eligible to offer sports betting on their reservations upon legalization in Colorado in 2020, but cannot offer gaming outside of tribal lands.[244] The state is unable to tax gaming revenues earned by tribal casinos on tribal land absent an explicit agreement.[245]
Currently, neither compact explicitly contemplates online betting. Rather, the Southern Ute compact provides that “[t]he Tribe may establish one or more [g]aming [f]acilities on the [r]eservation.”[246] Similarly, the state recognizes the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe’s right to conduct Class III gaming activities “on Indian [l]ands within the state of Colorado.”[247] The lack of guidance leaves open for interpretation whether the tribes can offer online sports betting after it becomes “explicitly authorized by the laws of the State.”[248]
From the beginning, state officials were unhelpful—even antagonistic—in discussions with the tribes regarding the answer to this question. In January 2023, the chairmen of both the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute addressed Colorado legislators, explaining that they were never consulted on Proposition DD or the legalization of sports betting.[249] Rather, the tribes’ efforts to confer with state officials after Proposition DD passed were met with extended delays and cancelled meetings,[250] which led to an overall lack of clarity on the tribes’ rights to offer sports betting mere weeks before the activity was set to become legal.[251]
Ultimately, despite the efforts made by the tribes to develop an online sportsbook in compliance with their obligations under their gaming compacts, Colorado officials have taken the position that, pursuant to the current compacts, neither tribe can legally accept wagers received from bettors outside of tribal land.[252] In a letter sent to the tribes, Dan Hartman, then Director of the Colorado Division of Gaming, indicated that tribal casinos would only be authorized to offer mobile sports betting if they obtained a license from the state and paid tax on the proceeds.[253] The tribes are adamant that they should not be required to obtain state licenses,[254] which would allow the state to increase regulatory pressure on the tribes and reduce their sovereignty in the ongoing “paradox” of tribal gaming.[255]
The dispute over online sports betting highlights that the current gaming compacts between Colorado and the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes are outdated and unjust. Rather than wholly exclude the tribes from the mobile sports betting market, Colorado officials should follow the lead of the states that have found ways to permit Native nations to participate in online sports betting through compact negotiations and amendments. These efforts will be discussed in the next Part.
IV. Tribal Participation in Sports Betting: Solutions From Other States
Online sports betting has become prolific in the half‑decade following its legalization in Colorado. While the best time to update the gaming compacts between the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes and Colorado would have been five years ago, the second best time is now. The continued failure of the current gaming compacts to properly address online sports betting—resulting in the total exclusion of tribal casinos from the market—makes them wholly inadequate in today’s gaming landscape. It’s become clear that a solution is needed.
Considering that the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes are currently involved in a lawsuit where they are seeking to offer mobile sports betting without being subject to state licensure,[256] one might think that the judicial process is the best path forward to resolve the ongoing mobile sports betting dispute. A court could interpret the “[e]xplictly [a]uthorized by the laws of the State”[257] clause in the gaming compacts as permitting the tribes to offer mobile sports betting as soon as the activity became legal in Colorado.[258] Nonetheless, the current weight of guidance and precedent indicate that bets placed outside of tribal land, without an explicit agreement in a gaming compact that such bets are deemed to take place on tribal land, are not governed by IGRA and would likely fall under state law licensing regimes.[259]
Even if a court were to rule in favor of the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes, this litigation could be lengthy, especially given the high likelihood of either party appealing an initial judgment. Any further delay as litigation gets resolved results in both tribes’ continued exclusion from the online sports betting market. Not only does this result in lost revenue for the tribes, but it also allows current state‑licensed casinos operating in Colorado to gain an even stronger foothold with consumers, creating a barrier to entry for tribal casinos that grows with each passing month. Furthermore, gaming compacts still govern the relationship between the tribes and the state prospectively, and the policies and aims of the gaming compacts, including self‑determination, sovereignty, and stability, are best achieved through mutual negotiation. Therefore, this Note advocates that Colorado officials adopt the approach of other states and negotiate a long overdue amendment to the existing gaming compacts.
This Part will discuss ways that different states have updated their compacts to explicitly authorize Native nations to engage in online sports betting. Section IV.A will introduce the hub‑and‑spoke model, employed in both Kansas and Florida, which uses compact language that expressly deems bets to occur wherever the server that accepts a particular bet is located. That model is contrasted with the “partnership” model in Section IV.B. The partnership model, used in New York, authorizes Native nations to partner with state‑licensed casinos to get a share of the mobile sports betting market.
A. The Hub‑and‑Spoke Model: Kansas and Florida
Sports betting became legal in Kansas in September 2022.[260] Under the initial version of the authorizing bill, a tribe could request the state to negotiate in good faith to amend its gaming compact to address sports wagering or betting.[261] However, the law explicitly provided that “[n]o compact described in subsection (a) shall include wagering beyond the boundaries of the compacting [T]ribe’s Indian lands, within the meaning of the Indian gaming regulatory act.”[262] Recognizing that this provision limited the ability to offer mobile sports betting, the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation pushed for a change to the sports betting law.[263] The law was amended in 2023, striking out the language prohibiting tribes from accepting sports bets placed beyond their lands.[264] Following this change, Kansas and the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation amended their gaming compact in June 2023.[265] Importantly, the amended compact permits mobile wagers “accepted on a server or other computer equipment at a facility established by the Tribe on its Reservation.”[266] As a result, the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation can now offer mobile sports betting throughout Kansas.[267]
The idea that a state can authorize a Native nation to offer mobile gaming to customers outside of tribal land through a compact was recently the subject of litigation in Florida.[268] A compact signed by the Florida governor and the Seminole Tribe in 2021 provides for a hub‑and‑spoke model to sports betting.[269] Specifically, the compact provides that “[a]ll such wagering shall be deemed at all times to be exclusively conducted by the Tribe at its [f]acilities where the sports book(s), including servers and devices to conduct the same, are located.”[270] This includes “any such wagering undertaken by a [p]atron physically located in the State but not on Indian [l]ands using an electronic device connected via the internet.”[271] Essentially, this language deems that bets are placed on Indian lands so long as the server is physically located there. The Florida compact goes a step further than the one in Kansas, as it provides the Seminole Tribe the exclusive right to offer mobile sports betting.[272] In exchange for exclusivity, the Seminole Tribe negotiated a revenue sharing agreement where it will pay Florida between 10 and 13.75 percent of its net proceeds.[273] When reviewing the compact, a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) official showed deference to the negotiations between the state and the tribe and supported the tribe having the opportunity to offer sports betting through modern means.[274] In this way, the BIA official implicitly acknowledged each party’s sovereignty and therefore allowed the paradox to diminish.
The compact between the Seminole Tribe and Florida was challenged by two state‑licensed casinos which were authorized to offer retail sports betting in Florida but were prevented from providing an online sportsbook pursuant to the exclusivity clause.[275] The casino raised similar arguments to those seen in Iipay Nation, claiming that the compact impermissibly permitted the tribe to offer sports betting outside of Indian Country in violation of IGRA.[276] In West Flagler Associates v. Haaland, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected the claim, stating that IGRA “regulate[s] gaming on Indian lands, and nowhere else.”[277] The court further stated that “IGRA does not prohibit a gaming compact—which is, at bottom, an agreement between a tribe and a state—from discussing other topics, including those governing activities ‘outside Indian lands.’”[278] Rather, IGRA specifically allows for any Tribal‑State compact to include provisions that are directly related to the operation of gaming activity.[279] Following this decision, the Seminole Tribe began offering mobile sports betting across Florida in December 2023.[280] The Supreme Court denied certiorari in June 2024.[281] The ability to exclusively offer mobile sports betting could be a windfall for the Seminole Tribe, which now operates a sportsbook that is estimated to process $2 billion in bets per month and is expected to generate billions in profit over the thirty‑year deal.[282]
The Department of Interior (DOI) has also weighed in on the hub‑and‑spoke model. In February 2024, the DOI issued a final rule providing that compacts may address statewide remote wagering that is directly related to the operation of gaming on Indian lands.[283] In order for the compact to authorize remote wagering or internet gaming originating outside Indian lands, the compact or state law must deem that, for the purposes of the law, such gaming takes place on Indian lands.[284]
The idea that the DOI would endorse and uphold a hub‑and‑spoke model as consistent with IGRA is a major development for Native nations wishing to offer a mobile betting platform. This model honors these Native nations’ rights to negotiate around current limitations requiring bets to be made in Indian Country. This opens the door for tribes to increase their economic potential and leverage the same opportunity as state‑licensed casinos while still upholding their sovereignty. However, the hub‑and‑spoke model is not the only method employed to bring mobile sports betting to Native nations.
B. The Partnership Model: New York
In January 2022, New York passed new legislation legalizing online sports betting.[285] This legislation provides that “[a]ll sports wagers through electronic communication placed in accordance with this section are considered placed or otherwise made when and where received by the mobile sports wagering licensee on such mobile sports wagering licensee’s server.”[286] However, only entities licensed by the state could offer sports betting.[287] The New York State Gaming Commission initially authorized nine operators to offer sports betting in the state.[288]
New York has gaming compacts with three Native nations which allow for Class III gaming activities, including retail sports betting.[289] However, these compacts do not address mobile sports betting, and the text of the online sports betting statute did not create any exceptions to state licensure for tribal casinos.[290] The language of the New York law and the existing compacts suggest Native nations in New York adopt one of three avenues to participate in mobile sports betting: (1) locating a server on the premises of a casino which has a mobile sports betting license, (2) going through the process of obtaining a state license, or (3) partnering with state‑licensed casinos.[291] In fact, state‑licensed casinos were incentivized to partner with the tribes because the New York State Gaming Commission, in authorizing mobile sports betting licenses, can “award additional points to an applicant that has entered into an agreement that includes revenue sharing related to such mobile sports wagering with compacted Native American [T]ribe(s) or nation(s).”[292]
Taking advantage of this provision in the law, the Oneida Indian Nation and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe partnered with Caesars Entertainment, while the Seneca Nation partnered with FanDuel to offer sports betting in the state of New York.[293] Although the tribes cannot offer their own mobile apps in New York, these partnerships allow them to participate in mobile sports betting and share in the revenue generated by commercial casinos. This model, which at least provides an avenue for tribes to share in the market for mobile sports betting, is certainly better than not permitting the tribes to offer remote sports betting at all. However, this Note advocates that the hub‑and‑spoke model ultimately serves tribal interests more effectively.
V. Proposals: Colorado and Federal Remedies
Both Colorado and the federal government can take action to allow Native nations to enter the mobile sports betting market. First, Section V.A will advocate that Colorado adopt the hub‑and‑spoke model used in Kansas and Florida and that Colorado deem that bets occur at the location of the server accepting them. This solution will allow the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute to offer mobile sports betting through updated compact language, which will provide much needed clarity in the law. Then, Section V.B will briefly address legislative or regulatory action that the federal government can take to assist Native nations across the country in accessing the online sports betting market.
A. Colorado Should Adopt the Hub‑and‑Spoke Model
Despite efforts made by the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Tribes to enter the mobile sports betting market, some state lawmakers remain concerned about the collateral effects of them doing so. One argument against the hub‑and‑spoke model, and tribes accepting remote wagering, that has gained traction centers around the protection of tax revenues earmarked for state water projects.[294] Specifically, some state lawmakers are concerned that, if tribes offer mobile sports betting, commercial gaming companies would relocate their servers onto tribal land, avoiding the 10 percent tax that is entirely allocated to funding to the Water Plan Implementation Cash Fund.[295] Although funding water projects is a noble and worthwhile goal, this should not be used as a reason to totally neglect economic and sovereignty‑based tribal interests, especially when the tribes have their own water concerns that deserve adequate funding.[296]
Instead, the solution lies somewhere in the middle, and a balance can be struck through negotiation which furthers both interests. For example, the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribes and Colorado can reach an agreement that allows tribal casinos to operate their own sportsbook while proscribing state‑licensed casinos from moving their operations to tribal land to capitalize on tax benefits. Alternatively, the parties could mutually agree on a revenue sharing agreement—like the one between the Seminole Tribe and Florida[297]—that both allows the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute to offer and regulate their own remote sports betting platforms while maintaining some revenue for important state water projects. Perhaps most importantly, amending the gaming compacts as this Note suggests prevents tribal casinos from needing to seek state licensure, which cedes the tribes’ regulatory control over gaming activities, implicating their sovereignty.[298] Gaming compacts reach their highest potential through flexible negotiations between sovereigns, rather than one side unilaterally imposing its terms and conditions.
In reflection of these ideals, Colorado officials should make it a priority to uphold and protect these interests through good‑faith efforts to negotiate with the tribes. Given that the gaming compacts between Colorado and the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute went into effect in 1995 and 1996, respectively, Colorado should work with these nations to modernize these agreements, acknowledging the realities of the current mobile sports betting market. The hub‑and‑spoke model, used in both Kansas and Florida, provides the most viable option. As proposed in this Note, the hub‑and‑spoke model would essentially allow the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute to accept bets placed from anywhere in Colorado so long as the server accepting the bets is located on tribal land.
To accomplish this, Colorado would need to renegotiate its compacts with these tribes to add language declaring that online wagering occurs on tribal land. As explained above, there is precedent for this type of agreement in both Kansas and Florida. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit upholding the agreement between Florida and the Seminole Tribe and the DOI’s recent rule endorsing agreements of this nature provide early indications that this type of compact negotiations is permissible.[299] The hub‑and‑spoke model is preferable to the partnership model—or any requirement that tribal casinos obtain state licensure—because it more accurately aligns with the policies and purposes of the Tribal‑State compacts as outlined in the language of the existing agreements.
First, the Ute Mountain Ute compact specifies that it is intended to “foster the continued development of an effective government‑to‑government relationship between the State and the Tribe.”[300] The “government‑to‑government” language sounds substantially equivalent to the federal self‑determination policy, which implicates the idea of tribal sovereignty, and aligns with the congressional intent behind IGRA. For the tribes to actually retain their self‑governance, they should be able to pursue economic development in ways that they determine to be in their best interests. This is especially true when the economic activity at issue, in this case sports betting, is already legal and pervasive throughout the state and the tribes have agreed to conduct the gaming in conformity with relevant provisions of their compacts.[301] Specifically, the tribes will govern and regulate gaming in a functionally equivalent manner to Colorado, respecting Colorado’s own sovereign interests in protecting its citizens.[302] Despite this, Colorado law is currently inhibiting the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute from pursuing a potentially lucrative form of economic development. The current position taken by Colorado officials—that the tribes must subject themselves to the licensure and regulation of state authorities to offer gaming which is otherwise permitted and governed by the gaming compacts—is antithetical to the sovereign‑to‑sovereign relationship between the tribes and the state.[303]
Second, an effective relationship between both tribes and Colorado is one that retains flexibility—an idea that was previously incorporated into both gaming compacts. For example, each compact allows for the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute to offer gaming that subsequently becomes legal in Colorado.[304] The hub‑and‑spoke model can be integrated into this language, applying to any future changes to internet gaming law in Colorado and any class of game.[305] Furthermore, the hub‑and‑spoke model is more conducive to evolving with the law than the partnership model used in New York, mostly because it involves fewer moving parts. Under the hub‑and‑spoke model as proposed in this Note, the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute would undisputedly be able to offer any online games as soon as they become legal in Colorado so long as the servers accepting the bets are located on tribal land. On the other hand, tribes in New York are already facing the need to renegotiate with the state and their casino partners as legislators consider expanding the legal forms of internet gaming.[306] These negotiations present additional barriers and delays in the ability for Native nations in New York to offer the same betting as their state‑licensed counterparts. This problem requires a forward‑looking, long‑lasting solution.
Finally, a stated goal of the compact is to provide a mechanism for the tribes to generate revenues.[307] Relatedly, the compact is intended to “provide for the effective regulation of Class III gaming in which the Tribe shall have the sole proprietary interest and be the primary beneficiary.”[308] The hub‑and‑spoke model can achieve both ideals. First, allowing the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute to accept wagers placed outside of their tribal lands will increase revenues by allowing them to reach beyond southwestern Colorado to the population centers and capture a share in the robust mobile sports betting market. Based on October 2024 numbers, if the tribes captured just 5 percent of the market, they would generate nearly $2 million in revenue per month.[309] Additionally, the hub‑and‑spoke model allows both tribes to operate their own sportsbooks, just as they currently operate their own casinos. This allows these tribes to remain the primary beneficiaries of any online sports betting. This remains true even if the tribes ultimately decide to agree—through negotiations as sovereigns—to some kind of revenue sharing agreement with Colorado. In that event, the hub‑and‑spoke model is still preferable to the partnership model because the tribes would retain operational and regulatory authority over their sports betting platforms while sharing the agreed upon portion of revenues.
Given Colorado’s stated interests in fostering effective gaming regulations and relationships with both tribes, state officials should negotiate both compacts to implement the hub‑and‑spoke model.
B. Potential Federal Remedies
Although this Note primarily focuses on current Colorado law, which prevents the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute from offering mobile sports betting, Native nations across the country are facing similar barriers, as evidenced by the negotiations that have taken place in Kansas, Florida, and New York. While the hub‑and‑spoke model could be an effective solution that could be adopted in all jurisdictions, federal action could also help to clarify existing law and provide for more uniform treatment across the country.
While the federal government has stayed out of sports betting regulation following the decision in Murphy, Congress can regulate sports gambling directly.[310] This is particularly true in the context of Indian gaming regulations, where IGRA remains the controlling law and Congress retains plenary power to act. In 2021, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives that would “[r]emove federal barriers regarding the offering of mobile wagers on Indian lands.”[311] Specifically, section 3 of the proposed bill states that “a wager made through an interactive wagering platform shall be deemed to be made at the physical location of the server or other computer equipment used to accept the wager, unless otherwise agreed to by a State and Indian Tribe.”[312] As written, this bill would supersede the nexus analysis from Iipay Nation and the NIGC guidance, allowing Native nations to accept online bets in gaming activities permitted in compacts.[313] Furthermore, this law would establish this interpretation as the general standard applicable to all Native nations with gaming compacts, preventing the need for extensive renegotiation. Such federal legislation would promote greater fairness by establishing a default position which permits tribes to participate in legal gaming activities on equal footing with state‑licensed casinos. States and tribes would then be able to negotiate specific details in their gaming compacts to tailor this default to their more individualized needs.
Other than enacting legislation, the NIGC can clarify its guidance on internet gaming.[314] The current guidance, which provides that internet gaming is deemed to occur where the bet is placed, has not been updated since the early 2000s.[315] With the downfall of PASPA and subsequent rise of mobile sports betting, the landscape has shifted significantly since this guidance was issued. Given this new context, the NIGC could decide that bets are deemed to occur where the server is located. While this may be helpful in spurring some change, it is unclear how useful a change in guidance would be given the current posture of courts, as described in Iipay Nation. Furthermore, in a recent rule by the DOI, Native nations and states must agree that remote wagering is deemed to take place on Indian land in order for tribes to accept such bets.[316] Therefore, affirmative legislation by Congress would be a more effective means to recognize Native nations’ rights to participate in mobile sports betting where retail sports betting is otherwise authorized in their compact.
Conclusion
It is time that Colorado law recognize the Southern Ute’s and Ute Mountain Ute’s tribal sovereignty to offer the same betting opportunities that state‑licensed casinos have been able to offer since sports gaming became legal in 2020. The advent and proliferation of mobile sports betting has drastically changed the landscape of gaming law, and the current gaming compacts between Colorado and these two tribes, which remain unchanged since the mid‑1990s, should be updated accordingly. While it is long overdue for the compacts to be updated, the renewed urgency with which this situation should be addressed has been made abundantly clear following the lawsuit filed by the Southern Ute Tribe in July 2024. The most prudent solution is for Colorado officials to negotiate with these tribes to provide a mechanism authorizing them to participate in online sports betting. The most effective way to do this, as evidenced by its use in other states, is the hub‑and‑spoke model, which would deem bets placed on the internet as occurring wherever the server accepting the bets is located. Making this change will allow everyone in Colorado to get in on the action.
* JD Candidate, University of Colorado Law School, 2025; BS Accounting, University of Kansas, 2017; MS Accounting, University of Denver, 2018. I would like to thank Professor Christina Stanton and the many members of the University of Colorado Law Review, both past and present, who spent considerable time and effort reviewing, providing feedback on, and editing this Note. I am grateful for their hard work and thoughtful insights which significantly improved this piece.
- When referring to Native peoples generally, the terms “Indian,” “Native American,” “Native peoples,” and “Indigenous peoples” are used interchangeably. Although the terms “Indian” or “Indian land” are legal terms of art, the Author and the University of Colorado Law Review acknowledge that the term “Indian” is outdated and can impose harm to Native peoples in the United States and elsewhere. The Author therefore elects to limit the use of the term outside of necessary references: when required as a legal term of art, to reference the body of law in the United States formally known as “Indian law,” and quotations from statute, case law, or other scholars’ work that use the term. ↑
- While Colorado did not offer mobile sports betting in early 2020, Nevada had offered sportsbook wagering for many years. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. ↑
- Saja Hindi, Colorado Prop DD, the Sports Betting Measure, Narrowly Passes, Denver Post, https://www.denverpost.com/2019/11/06/colorado-proposition-dd-results-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/SEU6-DAXN] (last updated Nov. 13, 2019, 3:46 PM). ↑
- Colorado, Am. Gaming Ass’n, https://www.americangaming.org/research/state-of-play-map/?state=colorado [https://perma.cc/ZP6Z-4Z8V]. ↑
- In this Note, “retail” sports betting refers to bets offered and placed at a physical place of business (casinos) as opposed to bets placed remotely through the internet or mobile apps. ↑
- In this Note, “state‑licensed” refers to casinos licensed by the Colorado Limited Gaming Control Commission. This term is used to differentiate these casinos from tribal casinos, which are subject to the exclusive licensing authority of the tribe. ↑
- Hindi, supra note 3. ↑
- Caesars Sportsbook Debuts Its Largest‑Ever Prop Betting Menu for Super Bowl LIX Inside the Caesars Superdome, Caesars Ent. (Jan. 30, 2025), https://newsroom.caesars.com/press-releases/press-release-details/2025/Caesars-Sportsbook-Debuts-its-Largest-Ever-Prop-Betting-Menu-for-Super-Bowl-LIX-Inside-the-Caesars-Superdome/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/GLY5-WGJM]. ↑
- Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018). ↑
- Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PAPSA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (PASPA). PASPA, enacted in 1992, prevented states, including Colorado, who were not already offering sports betting from doing so. 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a), invalidated by Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018). ↑
- Murphy, 584 U.S. at 455. ↑
- Interactive U.S. Map: Sports Betting, Am. Gaming Ass’n, https://www.americangaming.org/research/state-of-play-map [https://perma.cc/8GZA-22Q8]. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Wayne Parry, Americans Bet $220 Billion on Sports in 5 Years Since Legalization, PBS (May 8, 2023, 2:58 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/americans-bet-220-billion-on-sports-in-5-years-since-legalization [https://perma.cc/M8U4-6VWK]. ↑
- Licensed Sports Books and Operators, Colo. Dep’t of Revenue Specialized Bus. Grp., https://sbg.colorado.gov/licensed-sports-books-and-operators [https://perma.cc/7CN2-DZC8]. ↑
- Jesse Paul, Colorado’s Sports Betting Tax Revenue Doubled, Meaning Millions More for Water Projects, Colo. Sun (Aug. 7, 2023, 3:30 AM), https://coloradosun.com/2023/08/07/colorado-sports-betting-tax-revenue-2 [https://perma.cc/DTZ8-U833]. ↑
- Colorado collected $25.6 million in tax revenue during the 2022–2023 fiscal year alone. Id. Early estimates show that tax revenue reached almost $30 million in the 2023–2024 fiscal year. Chase McCleary, Colorado Can Now Allocate More Money from Sports Gambling to State Water Projects, Rocky Mountain PBS (Nov. 19, 2024), https://www.rmpbs.org/blogs/election-2024/prop-jj-sports-betting-colorado [https://perma.cc/CZ5R-P8RL]. ↑
- Gross gaming revenue is calculated by taking total wagers placed less any payments made to bettors. In December 2024, Colorado casinos collected almost $29.9 million in gross gaming revenues. See Colorado Sports Betting Proceeds, Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, Specialized Bus. Grp. (Dec. 2024), https://sbg.colorado.gov/sites/sbg/files/documents/56%20Monthly%20Summary%20%28December%20%2724%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JQE-FL7N]. ↑
- The Southern Ute Tribe is headquartered in Ignacio, Colorado, in the southwestern corner of the state. For a history of the tribe, see History, S. Ute Indian Tribe, https://www.southernute-nsn.gov/history [https://perma.cc/EN2H-L859]. ↑
- The tribal offices of the Ute Mountain Ute are located in Towaoc, Colorado, in the southwestern corner of the state. For more information on the tribe, see Index, Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, https://www.utemountainutetribe.com [https://perma.cc/ZVP6-7HMR]. ↑
- “Gaming” is a legal term used in both regulations and compacts to encompass all authorized gambling activities, including sports betting and traditional casino games. See, e.g., Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721. ↑
- Nick Coltrain, Colorado Tribal Leaders Say They Were Left Out of Sports‑Betting Law, Seek Inclusion in Historic Address, Denver Post, https://www.denverpost.com/2023/01/12/colorado-ute-tribes-address-legislature-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/3JQP-GF6H] (last updated Jan. 12, 2023, 7:39 AM). ↑
- Jesse Paul & Elliott Wenzler, Chairmen of Colorado’s Two Native American Tribes Ask Legislature to Remedy Sports Betting Inequity, Colo. Sun, https://coloradosun.com/2023/01/11/colorado-tribes-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/RQT5-8AM5] (last updated Jan. 12, 2023, 7:53 AM). ↑
- See discussion infra Sections II.D, III.B. ↑
- See discussion infra Sections II.D, III.B. ↑
- Verified Complaint at 18–19, ¶¶ 7–9, S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Polis, No. 1:24‑cv‑01886‑NRN (D. Colo. July 9, 2024). ↑
- Specialized Bus. Grp., Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, Colorado Sports Betting Proceeds: May 2020–April 2023, https://sbg.colorado.gov/sites/sbg/files/documents/Top%2010%20Sports%20by%20Total%20Wagers%20May%202020%20to%20Present.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9UN-ARSC] (showing that $808,913,306 of the $817,032,484 gross gaming revenue between May 2020 and April 2023 was generated from online bets). ↑
- AGA Commercial Gaming Revenue Tracker, Am. Gaming Ass’n (Jan. 16, 2024), https://www.americangaming.org/resources/aga-commercial-gaming-revenue-tracker [https://perma.cc/93A9-TJPL]. ↑
- Paul & Wenzler, supra note 23. Manuel Heart, Chairman of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, was quoted as saying, “[r]ight now for the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, [the] casino is one of our main sources of revenue coming in.” Id. Based on December 2024 numbers, capturing just 5 percent of the sports betting market would generate nearly $1.5 million in revenue per month for the tribes. Colorado Sports Betting Proceeds, supra note 18 (showing Colorado casinos generated $29,868,620 in gross gaming revenues from online sports betting in December 2024). ↑
- Shannon Mullane, Southern Ute Indian Tribe Sues Colorado Governor, Gaming Division Over Sports Betting, Colo. Sun (July 29, 2024, 4:09 PM), https://coloradosun.com/2024/07/11/southern-ute-indian-tribe-lawsuit-colorado-governor-gaming-division-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/9KZ8-5MGQ]. ↑
- The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe joined the lawsuit as a plaintiff in September 2024. Verified Amended Complaint, S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Polis, No. 1:24‑cv‑01886‑NRN (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2024). ↑
- Verified Complaint, supra note 26, at 18–19, ¶¶ 74, 79. ↑
- This litigation is still in its early stages as this Note goes to print. ↑
- “Hub‑and‑spoke” is a widely used term to describe an arrangement which deems that a bet takes place at the location of the server accepting the bet. Under this model, gaming would be deemed to occur within Indian Country if the server was located on tribal land (much like a physical casino), not based on where the bet originated. See, e.g., Letter from Bryan Newland, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Bureau Indian Affs., to Hon. Marcellus W. Osceola, Jr., Chairman, Seminole Tribe of Fla. 2 (Aug. 6, 2021) [hereinafter Letter from Bryan Newland], https://www.bia.gov/sites/default/files/dup/assets/as-ia/oig/gaming_compacts/508%20Compliant%202021.08.06%20Seminole%20Tribe%20Compact%20Letter%20to%20Tribe.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RL3-UGNJ]. ↑
- Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018). ↑
- John T. Holden, Prohibitive Failure: The Demise of the Ban on Sports Betting, 35 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 329, 334 (2019). ↑
- John T. Holden & Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Sports Gambling and the Law: How America Regulates Its Most Lucrative Vice, 2020 Wis. L. Rev. 907, 915. ↑
- Bookmaking is the process by which “bookmakers” determine the odds of particular outcomes of sporting events, collect bets placed based on these odds, and distribute money to the winners. Bookmakers keep track of these bets in ledgers, or “books.” For a general discussion of a bookmaking operation, see United States v. Box, 530 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (5th Cir. 1976). ↑
- S. Rep. No. 82‑725, at 113 (1951). ↑
- Id. at 114. ↑
- Holden, supra note 36, at 335. ↑
- Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a). ↑
- Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 917. ↑
- 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)–(b) (criminalizing traveling in interstate commerce in furtherance of an unlawful activity, which was defined to include any business enterprise involving gambling). ↑
- 18 U.S.C. § 1953(a) (criminalizing carrying or sending any device used for bookmaking in interstate commerce). ↑
- 18 U.S.C. § 224 (criminalizing carrying out any scheme to influence a sporting contest); see also Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 917 (explaining that this statute was created to attack the revenue created by influencing the outcomes of sporting events in favor of the positions held by organized crime groups). ↑
- 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (criminalizing conducting or managing all or part of an illegal gambling business). ↑
- John T. Holden, Regulating Sports Wagering, 105 Iowa L. Rev. 575, 577 (2020); see also Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 919. ↑
- John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, The Sports Bribery Act: A Law and Economics Approach, 42 N. Ky. L. Rev. 453, 458 (2015). Henry Hill, who would later become inspiration for the film “Goodfellas,” orchestrated a scheme where he and his partners manipulated the outcome of nine games during the 1978 to 1979 season. Dan Holmes, Looking Back on the Boston College Basketball Point‑Shaving Scandal, PlayMA, https://www.playma.com/news/boston-college-basketball-point-shaving-scandal-illegal-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/A3FY-RDN3] (last updated Aug. 8, 2023). Hill placed bets that the Boston College team would lose against the spread, or, in other words, Boston College would not win the game by the amount set by the bookmaker. He and his partners then paid three players $2,500 per game to help ensure that result. Id. Hill and his partners were able to win more than $250,000. Id. For a more detailed discussion on this scandal, see David Purdum, ‘The Worst Fix Ever,’ ESPN (Oct. 3, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://www.espn.com/espn/chalk/story/_/id/11633538/betting-chronicling-worst-fix-ever-1978-79-bc-point-shaving-scandal [https://perma.cc/Q5M5-AV6M]. ↑
- Holden, supra note 36, at 335–36. ↑
- Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 919–20. ↑
- Holden, supra note 36, at 335. ↑
- Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 920. ↑
- “Government entity” was defined by the Act to include states, political subdivisions of states, and tribes. 28 U.S.C. § 3701(2). ↑
- 28 U.S.C. § 3702, invalidated by Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018). ↑
- 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (“Section 3702 shall not apply to—(1) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme in operation in a State or other governmental entity, to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that State or other governmental entity at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990.”); see also Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 920 (“PASPA did not ban sports wagering entirely. Instead, it froze it.”). ↑
- Kyle Wyant, Note, Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $231 Million Dollars: How NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey Could Negatively Affect Nevada’s Monopoly on Sports Betting, 7 U. Nev. L.V. Gaming L.J. 223, 223–24 (2017). Three other states, Delaware, Oregon, and Montana, were allowed to retain their existing, limited sports betting offerings in the form of lotteries. Id. ↑
- Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 920. ↑
- See id. at 921. ↑
- Spectrum Gaming Grp., Internet Gambling Developments in International Jurisdictions: Insights for Indian Nations 12–14 (2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20120324092325/http://www.indiangaming.org/info/alerts/Spectrum-Internet-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TWL-GQQ5]. ↑
- Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 921. At the time, most internet gaming companies were based in foreign countries, making any regulatory efforts challenging. See H.R. Rep. No. 109‑552, at 6 (2006). Based on these estimates, the online black market for sports betting was at least as large as the market for legal gaming, as casinos in 2003 generated almost $73 billion in revenues, including amounts from tribal casinos, state‑licensed casinos, and state lotteries. Melissa S. Kearney, The Economic Winners and Losers of Legalized Gambling 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 11234, 2005). ↑
- Benjamin C. Wickert, Note, All in, but Left Out: How the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Seeks to Eradicate Online Gambling in the United States, 10 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 215, 220 (2007). ↑
- H.R. Rep. No. 109‑412, pt. 1, at 2 (2006). ↑
- 31 U.S.C. § 5363. ↑
- Id. §§ 5362(10)(A), 5367. ↑
- Lisa Boikess, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006: The Pitfalls of Prohibition, 12 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 151, 171 (2008). ↑
- While earlier bills proposed to amend the Wire Act to target illegal online betting, the enacted version of UIGEA prohibits American financial institutions from processing payments related to illegal internet gambling. See id. at 170–71. The goal of the UIGEA was to cut off the main sources of funding for internet operators, which largely consisted of credit card payments and wire transfers. Id. at 171. The enforcement mechanisms are targeted at financial institutions accepting and processing payments and not individual gamblers. Id. at 174. As a result, gamblers were still able to access sportsbooks and other forms of gambling that used international banking systems. Id. at 192–93. Furthermore, the banking industry was largely unequipped to effectively monitor all online gambling transactions because credit card policies and transaction coding systems could be manipulated to misrepresent the underlying business activities associated with the payment. Id. at 193. ↑
- See discussion infra Section I.B. ↑
- Marc Edelman, Regulating Sports Gambling in the Aftermath of Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 26 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 313, 321 (2018). ↑
- Leagues were particularly concerned about the fallout that sports betting scandals could cause and maintaining the credibility of their leagues. See, e.g., supra note 49 and accompanying text. Another particularly notable scandal involved the “Black Sox” in 1919 where Chicago White Sox players fixed World Series games. For a description of this and other scandals, see Jared Bahir Browsh, Learning Lessons from Historic Sports‑Betting Scandals, Colo. Arts & Sci. Mag. (May 8, 2024), https://www.colorado.edu/asmagazine/2024/05/28/learning-lessons-historic-sports-betting-scandals [https://perma.cc/T5F7-DJSV]. ↑
- Flagler v. U.S Att’y for Dist. of N.J., No. 06‑3699, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70916, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Sep. 25, 2007). ↑
- Id. at *3–4. ↑
- Id. at *6–7. A plaintiff must meet three requirements in order to have standing, meaning the ability for their claim to be heard by a court: (1) the plaintiff has suffered a legally cognizable injury that is both concrete and not hypothetical, (2) the injury was caused by the defendant’s action, and (3) the injury can be redressed by the court ruling in favor of the plaintiff. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). ↑
- The horsemen’s associations represented the interests of the thoroughbred and standardbred horse industries, seeking to enable betting for horse racing. Interactive Media Ent. & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, No. 09‑1301, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23383, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011). ↑
- Id. at *5, 10–11. ↑
- Id. at *4. ↑
- Id. at *32. ↑
- See Off. of Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 295 (3d Cir. 2009). ↑
- The leagues in this case included the National Football League, the National Basketball Association, the National Hockey League, the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, and the National Collegiate Athletic Association. Id. ↑
- See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. ↑
- Markell, 579 F.3d at 296. ↑
- Id. at 296–97. ↑
- Id. at 303–04. ↑
- See NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir. 2013). ↑
- In fact, just before passing the Sports Wagering Law, New Jersey removed a provision from its Constitution which made sports betting unconstitutional. Id. ↑
- Id. at 214. ↑
- Id. at 224. ↑
- Id. at 217 (citing NCAA v. Christie, No. 12–4947, 2012 WL 6698684 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012)). ↑
- Id. at 237. The anti‑commandeering principle is a limit on the power of Congress, reflecting the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of legislative powers to the states. Id. at 227. Under this doctrine, Congress cannot directly instruct states to regulate an activity, instead requiring Congress to regulate the activity itself. Charlotte S. Butash, Note, The Anti‑Commandeering Doctrine in Civil Rights Litigation, 55 Harv. C.R.‑C.L. L. Rev. 681, 682 (2020). For a history of the development of the principle, see id. at 688–94. ↑
- NCAA, 730 F.3d at 231. ↑
- Id. at 232. ↑
- Id. at 245 (Vanaskie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). ↑
- Id. at 251 (Vanaskie, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). ↑
- Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 930. ↑
- Edelman, supra note 69, at 323–24. ↑
- Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453, 464–65 (2018). ↑
- Id. at 465. ↑
- Id. at 458, 474. ↑
- Id. at 474. ↑
- Id. at 486. ↑
- 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). ↑
- Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 942. ↑
- Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721. ↑
- Many scholars divide Federal Indian Law into different policy periods or eras, each of which provide a general framework governing the relationship between the United States and Native nations during a particular time. See, e.g., Robert J. Miller, The History of Federal Indian Policies (Mar. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1573670 [https://perma.cc/3J6A-CSSA] (providing a summary of federal Indian policy broken into nine different eras). ↑
- See American Indian Movement (AIM), History, https://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/american-indian-movement-aim [https://perma.cc/9BQM-582K] (last updated Sept. 28, 2023). ↑
- Miller, supra note 104, at 18. ↑
- Perhaps the most notable legislative act was the Indian Self‑Determination and Education Assistance Act, passed in 1975. As part of this Act, Congress committed to “supporting and assisting Indian [T]ribes in the development of strong and stable [T]ribal governments, capable of administering quality programs and developing the economies of their respective communities.” 25 U.S.C. § 5302. ↑
- Miller, supra note 104, at 18–19. ↑
- Id. at 19. ↑
- Id. at 18. For a definition of tribal sovereignty, see Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of Tribal Sovereignty: Three Frameworks for Developing Indian Gaming Law and Policy, 4 Nev. L.J. 262, 268–69 (2004). ↑
- Exec. Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000) (“The United States recognizes the right of Indian [T]ribes to self‑government and supports [T]ribal sovereignty and self‑determination.”). ↑
- President Obama reissued Executive Order 13175 in 2009. Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Tribal Nations and the United States: An Introduction 33 (2020), https://archive.ncai.org/tribalnations/introduction/Indian_Country_101_Updated_February_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/67C7-FNQX]. ↑
- Light & Rand, supra note 110, at 268. ↑
- Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, supra note 112, at 23. ↑
- Id. at 40. ↑
- Light & Rand, supra note 110, at 266. ↑
- See infra Section II.C. ↑
- Light & Rand, supra note 110, at 270. ↑
- Id. ↑
- See supra Section I.B. ↑
- While this Note mostly focuses on state action, the federal government could also step in to recognize Native nations’ rights to offer mobile sports betting. See infra Section V.B. ↑
- Robert N. Clinton, Enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988: The Return of the Buffalo to Indian Country or Another Federal Usurpation of Tribal Sovereignty?, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 17, 21 (2010). ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. The regulatory jurisdiction between the federal, state, and tribal governments is complex and changing. In general, Congress has exclusive and plenary authority over Indian affairs, and state law does not apply on tribal land absent express authorization by Congress. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, 40 Hum. Rts. 3 (2015). ↑
- See United States v. Sosseur, 181 F.2d 873, 874–75 (7th Cir. 1950); see also 18 U.S.C. § 13; U.S. Dep’t of Just., Crim. Res. Manual § 667. ↑
- Sosseur, 181 F.2d at 876. ↑
- See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 25. ↑
- Johnson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1175(a). ↑
- Id. § 1172(a) (“[I]t shall not be unlawful to transport in interstate or foreign commerce any gambling device into any State in which the transported gambling device is specifically enumerated as lawful in a statute of that State.”). ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 25–27. ↑
- Id. at 27. ↑
- See id. at 28. ↑
- Id. at 34. The Johnson Act defined “gambling devices” as slot machines, roulette wheels, and other machines or mechanical devices designed and manufactured primarily for use in connection with gambling. 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a). ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 34. The OCCA defined an illegal gambling business to include gambling activity that violated applicable state law. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b). ↑
- United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1980). The court held that, although state officials could not enforce Washington gambling laws against the Puyallup Tribe, the tribe’s actions were nonetheless in violation of applicable state gaming law and therefore in violation of the OCCA. Id. at 895. ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 39. ↑
- Kathryn R.L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success of Indian Gaming, 5 Chap. L. Rev. 47, 50–51 (2002); see supra text accompanying notes 106–110. ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 40 n.98. ↑
- Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 Nev. L.J. 285, 287 (2003). ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 31. ↑
- See Washburn, supra note 140, at 287–88. ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 29. ↑
- Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 314–15 (5th Cir. 1981). ↑
- Id. at 314. In this case, state officials attempted to justify their ability to regulate gaming activity pursuant to Public Law 280, a federal law that expressly allows states to exercise criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over tribal affairs in certain cases. Id. at 312–13. However, the court held that Public Law 280 does not give states general regulatory power but instead requires the state to assert prohibitory authority. Id. at 313. Under this analysis, the court examined whether bingo was prohibited as against public policy in Florida or merely regulated by the state. Id. After examining the statute, the court found that Florida’s law was regulatory, largely because bingo was authorized for recreational and charitable purposes. Id. at 314. Therefore, state jurisdiction could not be extended over tribal gaming under Public Law 280. Id. at 316. ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 31. ↑
- Id. at 44. ↑
- Id. at 45. ↑
- California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 205–06 (1987). ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. at 211. ↑
- Id. at 212. ↑
- Washburn, supra note 140, at 289. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 53. ↑
- Id. at 72. ↑
- Id. at 73. ↑
- Id. at 74. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. at 73. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. at 80. ↑
- S. Rep. No. 100‑446, at 6 (1988). ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 81. ↑
- S. Rep. No. 100‑446, at 6. ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 81. ↑
- Id.; S. Rep. No. 100‑446, at 13–14. ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 84; S. Rep. No. 100‑446, at 13–14. ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 84–85. ↑
- Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996) (holding that 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7), which gave federal courts jurisdiction over cases initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a state to negotiate in good faith, violated the Eleventh Amendment). ↑
- Clinton, supra note 122, at 89–91. ↑
- Randall K. Q. Akee et al., The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and Its Effect on American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. Econ. Persp. 185, 192 (2015). ↑
- 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). One scholar, acknowledging the rather limited number of activities falling within this category, referred to Class I games as the “nickel‑and‑dime stuff” that governments are largely not interested in regulating. Erik M. Jensen, Indian Gaming on Newly Acquired Lands, 47 Washburn L.J. 675, 683–84 (2008). ↑
- 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). ↑
- Id. § 2703(7)(A). ↑
- Id. § 2710(a)(2). Class II games are jointly regulated by the tribal government and the NIGC, but not by states. Akee et al., supra note 174. ↑
- Id. § 2703(8). ↑
- Id. § 2710(d)(1). ↑
- Id. § 2704(a). ↑
- About Us, Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, https://www.nigc.gov/commission/about-us [https://perma.cc/2WGC-NAQG]. ↑
- 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (2025). ↑
- The Commissioner’s role in approving ordinances is to ensure that the tribal resolution meets certain requirements. The Commissioner should only disprove of an ordinance if it is not in compliance with the governing documents of a tribe or if a tribe was unduly influenced in the adoption of the ordinance. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 522.7–522.8 (2025). ↑
- Holden & Edelman, supra note 37, at 945. ↑
- Tribal Casinos in Colorado, Colo. Dep’t of Revenue Specialized Bus. Grp., https://sbg.colorado.gov/tribal-casinos-in-colorado [https://perma.cc/K2S6-FL5S]. ↑
- 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (“Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands.”); see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 785 (2014) (stating the IGRA “creates a framework for regulating gaming activity on Indian lands”). ↑
- 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A). ↑
- Jennifer L. Carleton, Internet Gaming on Indian Lands, Nev. Gaming Law., Sept. 2019, at 85, 86. ↑
- Id. (quoting Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Gen. Couns., Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, to Joseph Speck, Nic‑A‑Bob Prods. (Mar. 13, 2001) (regarding the National Indian Lottery)). ↑
- Linda J. Shorey & Marsha A. Sajer, The Uneasy Nexus Between Internet Gaming and Tribal Gaming, 14 Gaming L. Rev. & Econ. 239, 244 (2010). ↑
- See id. at nn.31–32 (noting the DOJ position was taken in 1999, and the NIGC guidance was issued in 2001); see also Tony Batt, Colorado Tribe Pushes Legal Boundary with New Sports‑Betting App, Klein Moynihan Turco LLP (June 15, 2020), https://kleinmoynihan.com/casino-sports-betting-app [https://perma.cc/RXJ3-MM3C]. ↑
- California v. Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel, 898 F.3d 960, 968 (9th Cir. 2018). ↑
- Id. at 962. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. at 965. ↑
- See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. ↑
- Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel, 898 F.3d at 967–68. ↑
- Id. at 965; see supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text for an explanation of the UIGEA’s provisions. ↑
- Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel, 898 F.3d at 968. ↑
- See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 795 (2014) (“Unless federal law provides differently, ‘Indians going beyond reservation boundaries’ are subject to any generally applicable state law.”). In this case, Bay Mills opened a gaming facility which offered Class III games in the town of Vanderbilt, Michigan, 125 miles outside of the tribe’s reservation. Id. at 786. The Supreme Court held that IGRA did not apply because Bay Mills was not conducting this gaming “on Indian lands” within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 791. IGRA contains a partial waiver of sovereign immunity against tribes, allowing states to sue in federal court for violations of any Tribal‑State gaming compact. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii). The Supreme Court held that, because IGRA did not govern this gaming, IGRA’s waiver of sovereign immunity was inapplicable. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. at 791. Although this prevented Michigan from seeking remedy in federal court, Michigan possessed a “panoply of tools” to enforce “its law on its own lands.” Id. at 796. For example, Michigan could deny Bay Mills a license for off‑reservation gaming, bring a suit against tribal officials seeking an injunction for gambling without a license, or prosecute anyone maintaining an unlawful gaming establishment. Id. at 795–96. ↑
- Colo. Code Regs. § 207‑2(1.3)(2) (2025) (“No person shall make any unauthorized wager or conduct any sports betting activity on its premises or through any online or electronic means unless in accordance with the act, the [r]ules and [r]egulations promulgated by the Commission, or the laws and regulations governing other betting activities which are licensed or approved by an agency of the State of Colorado.”). ↑
- The Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute have exclusive licensing authority with respect to tribal gaming. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe – State of Colorado Gaming Compact 13 (1995), https://www.bia.gov/sites/default/files/dup/assets/as-ia/oig/pdf/508_compliant_1995.08.21_southern_ute_tribal_state_gaming_compact.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ7L-HTSV]; The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of Colorado Gaming Compact 12 (1996), https://www.bia.gov/sites/default/files/dup/assets/as-ia/oig/pdf/508_compliant_1996.03.19_ute_mountian_ute_tribe_tribal_state_gaming_compact.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3PB-TFPD]. ↑
- Batt, supra note 192. ↑
- Verified Complaint, supra note 26, at 12, ¶ 48. The tribe argued that operating an online sportsbook was consistent with their compact with Colorado, which permits the tribe to engage in any gaming under tribal licensure once it becomes legalized in the state. Id. at 17–19; see infra note 240 and accompanying text. ↑
- The tribe was using a vendor called US Bookmaking, which provided “advisory services” on sports bets. Verified Complaint, supra note 26, at 13, ¶¶ 53–54. ↑
- Id. at 13, ¶¶ 50, 53. ↑
- The tribe closed its app because “the State’s disregard for the Gaming Compact and IGRA made sports betting operations challenging and more expensive for the tribe, requiring extensive reassurance of its vendor and suppliers and unnecessarily placed a cloud of uncertainty over tribal sports betting in Colorado.” Id. at 16–17, ¶ 67. ↑
- Andrew Brandt, Professional Sports Leagues’ Big Bet: “Evolving” Attitudes on Gambling, 28 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 273, 277 (2017). ↑
- Kyle Fredrickson, How Legalized Sports Betting in Colorado Could Become a Reality by 2019, Denver Post, https://www.denverpost.com/2018/05/14/legalized-sports-betting-colorado [https://perma.cc/4M9N-JWFL] (last updated May 17, 2018, 1:32 PM). ↑
- Verified Complaint, supra note 26, at 11–12, ¶¶ 39–47. ↑
- Fredrickson, supra note 210. ↑
- Colo. Off. of the Att’y Gen., Formal Opinion Letter on Commercial Sports Betting Under Colorado Law 11 (Aug. 2, 2018), https://wp-cpr.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/2019/06/sports-gambling_final-formal_opinion_08-02-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6U9-SV3R]. ↑
- Anna Staver, Colorado Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Legalize Sports Betting, Denver Post, https://www.denverpost.com/2019/04/18/colorado-lawmakers-introduce-bill-to-legalize-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/3CAJ-ZZ8B] (last updated Oct. 4, 2019, 12:05 PM). ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Colo. Legis. Council, HB 24‑1436 Fiscal Note 2 (2024), https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2024A/bills/fn/2024a_hb1436_00.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UKY-U7CX]. ↑
- Ben Markus, A Bill Legalizing Sports Betting in Colorado Cleared the Capital, but There Are More Hurdles Ahead, Colo. Pub. Radio (May 3, 2019, 9:49 PM), https://www.cpr.org/2019/05/03/a-bill-legalizing-sports-betting-in-colorado-cleared-the-capitol-but-there-are-more-hurdles-ahead [https://perma.cc/KE5N-D3GB]. ↑
- What Is TABOR?, Jefferson Cnty. Colo., https://www.jeffco.us/3994/What-is-TABOR [https://perma.cc/47CS-5XN8]. ↑
- See Markus, supra note 218. ↑
- Ben Markus & Michael Elizabeth Sakas, Proposition DD on the 2019 Colorado Ballot: Legalizing Sports Betting, Colo. Pub. Radio (Oct. 16, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.cpr.org/2019/10/16/proposition-dd-on-the-2019-colorado-ballot-legalizing-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/G4WU-XCGB]. ↑
- Colo. Legis. Council, Draft Proposition DD: Legalization and Taxation of Sports Betting 1 (2019), https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/initiative%2520referendum_2019-2020%20hb%2019-1327vf.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3NS-77HZ]. ↑
- In Colorado, in‑person casino gaming is legal in the cities of Black Hawk, Central City, and Cripple Creek. Id. at 2. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Hindi, supra note 3. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Am. Gaming Ass’n, Gaming Regulations and Statutory Requirements: Colorado 6 (2022), https://www.americangaming.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/AGAGamingRegulatoryFactSheet_Colorado-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP6E-MC5Z]. ↑
- Colo. Code Regs. § 207‑2(3.11)(1)(a) (2025). ↑
- See supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text; see also Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 227, at 2. ↑
- See Ben Markus, Prop DD Won. Here’s When and How You Can Place Your 1st Colorado Sports Bet, Colo. Pub. Radio (Nov. 7, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.cpr.org/2019/11/07/prop-dd-won-heres-when-and-how-you-can-place-your-1st-colorado-sports-bet-and-more-questions-answered [https://perma.cc/5WYX-YPYR]. ↑
- Colorado Sports Betting Revenue, Play Colo., https://www.playcolorado.com/revenue [https://perma.cc/FPW9-RMF5]. ↑
- Corey H. Jones, Colorado Got $6.6M from Its First Year of Sports Betting. Where Does that Money Go Now?, Colo. Pub. Radio (June 2, 2021, 11:11 AM), https://www.cpr.org/2021/06/02/colorado-first-year-sports-betting-money-plans [https://perma.cc/R33E-PTEY]. ↑
- McCleary, supra note 17. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Jones, supra note 232. ↑
- Specialized Business Group, supra note 27. ↑
- The Southern Ute Indian Tribe – State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 6 (“The Tribe may establish one or more [g]aming [f]acilities on the [r]eservation.”); The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 11–12 (“The Tribe may establish one or more [g]aming [f]acilities on Indian [l]ands within the state of Colorado.”). ↑
- The Southern Ute Indian Tribe – State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 1. ↑
- Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 227, at 1. ↑
- The Southern Ute Indian Tribe – State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 5. ↑
- The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 43. ↑
- Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 227, at 1. ↑
- The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 8. ↑
- See Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 227. In its lawsuit, the Southern Ute Tribe argues that the “explicitly authorized” provision allows the tribe to offer mobile sports betting in accordance with Colorado law. Verified Complaint, supra note 26, at 3, 8–9, ¶¶ 4, 28–30. ↑
- The Southern Ute Indian Tribe – State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 31 (“Except as authorized by this Compact, the State or any of its political subdivisions shall not impose any tax, fee, charge or other assessment upon the Tribe.”); The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 36 (“The State shall not impose any tax, fee, charge or other assessment upon the [T]ribe or its [g]aming [f]acility, operations, revenues, and, property.”). ↑
- The Southern Ute Indian Tribe – State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 6. ↑
- The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 11–12. ↑
- The Southern Ute Indian Tribe – State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 5. ↑
- Paul & Wenzler, supra note 23. Colorado law requires the legislature to invite the chairmen to speak on tribal issues annually. Id. ↑
- “Roughly a year and a half into Colorado sports betting and its improper threatening campaign to the Tribe’s vendor . . . [Colorado officials] finally sent an invitation for a ‘formal consultation’ regarding ‘[s]ports betting within the state of Colorado and within Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute Tribal casinos.’” Verified Complaint, supra note 26, at 16, ¶ 63. ↑
- Id. at 11–12, ¶¶ 39–46. ↑
- Id. at 14, ¶ 56 (“The Division considers such gaming occurring off Tribal lands but within the state of Colorado, and the facilitation of such gaming, to be illegal.”). ↑
- Id. ¶ 58. ↑
- “The anti‑sovereignty approach of the Defendants—seeking to unlawfully control the Tribe’s governmental activities and control the use of the Tribe’s money—is shocking and entirely unjustified.” Id. at 4–5, ¶ 9. ↑
- See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. ↑
- See generally Verified Complaint, supra note 26. ↑
- The Southern Ute Indian Tribe – State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 5; The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 8. ↑
- In federal Indian law, there is a canon of construction which mandates that treaties with tribes should be construed liberally in favor of the tribe, with all ambiguities resolved in their favor. See, e.g., Meredith Harris, Comment, Analyzing the Implications of the Supreme Court’s Application of the Canons of Construction in Recent Federal Indian Law Cases, 10 Am. Indian L.J. 1, 2 (2022). ↑
- See supra Section II.D. ↑
- Jason Alatidd, Sports Betting Is Now Legal in Kansas. Here’s What to Know When Gambling on Chiefs, K‑State, KU, Topeka Cap.‑J., https://www.cjonline.com/story/sports/2022/09/01/kansas-sports-betting-legal-how-bet-chiefs-kstate-ku-football/7940582001 [https://perma.cc/ZSK2-EQ9C] (last updated Sept. 1, 2022, 12:36 PM). ↑
- S. 84, § 18(a), 2021 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2022) (as enrolled to be effective July 1, 2022). ↑
- Id. § 18(b). ↑
- Matthew Kredell, Kansas Legislature Approves Changes for Tribal Participation in Kansas Online Sports Betting, Play USA, https://www.playusa.com/changes-impact-kansas-tribal-online-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/2TLX-WL3Z] (last updated May 8, 2024). ↑
- H.B. 2058, 2023 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2023) (as initially substituted by the Kansas Senate). ↑
- Andrew Bahl, Prairie Band Potawatomi OK’d for Sports Betting, but This Court Case Could Change the Game, Topeka Cap.‑J. (June 5, 2023, 6:01 AM), https://www.cjonline.com/story/news/politics/government/2023/06/05/sports-betting-ok-on-kansas-prairie-band-potawatomi-tribal-land/70269467007 [https://perma.cc/49NG-NSSC]. ↑
- Amendment to the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation—Kansas Gaming Compact 1 (July 11, 2023), https://www.bia.gov/sites/default/files/dup/assets/as-ia/oig/pdf/508_compliant_2023.07.18_prairie_band_potawatomi_nation_tribal_state_gamigncompact.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV5W-RS3H] (as approved by the U.S. Dep’t of Interior). ↑
- Bahl, supra note 265. ↑
- Dara Kam, Seminole Tribe of Florida Gets Another Win in Sports Betting Case, Tallahassee Democrat, https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/local/state/2023/09/15/sports-betting-in-florida-seminole-tribes-gambing-of-florida-gets-another-win-in-sports-betting-case/70834890007 [https://perma.cc/D78S-JGPQ] (last updated Sept. 15, 2023, 1:06 PM). ↑
- Dara Kam, Seminole Tribe of Florida Is Ready to Take the Next Steps to Expand Sports Betting, WUSF (Nov. 2, 2023, 5:36 AM), https://www.wusf.org/local-state/2023-11-02/seminole-tribe-florida-next-steps-expand-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/T3B4-CWVB]. ↑
- Gaming Compact Between the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the State of Florida 15 (2021). ↑
- Id. ↑
- Scott Simon & Talia Blake, Gambling Companies Are Challenging a Florida Tribe Over Online Betting in the State, NPR (Sept. 30, 2023, 7:57 AM), https://www.npr.org/2023/09/30/1202828650/gambling-companies-are-challenging-a-florida-tribe-over-online-betting-in-the-st [https://perma.cc/9VQ8-RJ9F]. ↑
- Gaming Compact Between the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the State of Florida, supra note 270, at 48. ↑
- Letter from Bryan Newland, supra note 34, at 6–8. ↑
- W. Flagler Assocs., Ltd. v. Haaland, 71 F.4th 1059, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 2023). ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. at 1065 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 795 (2014)). ↑
- Id. at 1062 (quoting Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. at 796). ↑
- Id. at 1067; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii). ↑
- The Seminole Tribe of Florida Will Resume Gambling Payments to the State, WFSU (Dec. 11, 2023, 9:17 AM), https://news.wfsu.org/state-news/2023-12-11/the-seminole-tribe-of-florida-will-resume-gambling-payments-to-the-state [https://perma.cc/BGN4-2PVK]. ↑
- W. Flagler Assocs., Ltd. v. Haaland, 144 S. Ct. 10 (2024). ↑
- Talia Blake, Winning Big or Hardly Betting: Legal Sports Betting Marks One Year in Florida, WUSF (Nov. 12, 2024, 1:50 PM), https://www.wusf.org/sports/2024-11-12/winning-big-hardly-betting-legal-sports-betting-marks-one-year-florida [https://perma.cc/PN7A-GX2C]. ↑
- 25 C.F.R. § 293.26 (2025). ↑
- Id. ↑
- Jesse McKinley, Online Sports Betting’s N.Y. Debut: $2.4 Billion in Wagers in 5 Weeks, N.Y. Times (Feb 22, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/22/nyregion/sports-betting-ny.html [https://perma.cc/T7CL-ECSV]. ↑
- N.Y. Racing, Pari‑Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 1367‑A(2)(d) (Consol. 2023). ↑
- Id. § 1367‑A(2)(a). ↑
- New York Picks 9 Vendors for Lucrative Mobile Sports Betting, NBC N.Y., https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/new-york-picks-9-vendors-for-lucrative-mobile-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/8TZK-SCXF] (last updated Nov. 9, 2021, 1:53 AM). ↑
- Chez Oxendine, As Online Sports Betting Explodes in New York, Tribes Grapple with New Questions, Tribal Bus. News (Apr. 18, 2022), https://tribalbusinessnews.com/sections/gaming/13871-as-online-sports-betting-explodes-in-new-york-tribes-grapple-with-new-questions [https://perma.cc/Z582-E5QX]. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. ↑
- N.Y. Racing, Pari‑Mutuel. Wagering & Breeding Law § 1367‑A(7)(a‑1) (Consol. 2023). ↑
- Oxendine, supra note 289. ↑
- Jerd Smith, Colorado Tribes Want to Get into Lucrative Online Sports Betting. But a Long‑Running Dispute Is Getting in the Way, Colo. Sun (June 21, 2024, 3:45 AM), https://coloradosun.com/2024/06/21/colorado-tribes-want-into-lucrative-online-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/T9WV-VDZ5]. In November 2024, Colorado voters passed a resolution that lifted the $29 million annual cap on the sports betting tax, meaning that the entire tax collected from sports betting now funds water projects. Tax revenue is projected to exceed $30 million in the 2024 fiscal year. McCleary, supra note 17. ↑
- Smith, supra note 294; supra text accompanying notes 216–217. ↑
- Paul & Wenzler, supra note 23. ↑
- See supra note 270; see supra text accompanying note 273. ↑
- Verified Complaint, supra note 26, at 4–5, ¶ 9; see supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text (discussing the “paradox” in Indian gaming law). ↑
- See, e.g., W. Flagler Assocs., Ltd. v. Haaland, 71 F.4th 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2023); see also 25 C.F.R. § 293.26 (2025). ↑
- The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 2. ↑
- Verified Complaint, supra note 26, at 11–12, ¶¶ 43–44 (“The Tribal Sports Betting Rules were largely modeled off the State’s rules and drafted to conform to the requirements of the Colorado and federal law.”). ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. at 4–5, ¶ 9. ↑
- The Southern Ute Indian Tribe – State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 6; The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 11–12. ↑
- “iGaming” has an active market in six states already, generating over $6 billion in revenue. AGA Commercial Gaming Revenue Tracker, supra note 28, at 12. ↑
- Nicholaus Garcia, New York Online Casinos Could Complicate State/Tribal Relations, Play USA, https://www.playusa.com/complicated-state-tribal-relations-new-york-online-casinos [https://perma.cc/4W6D-4XZ7] (last updated Jan. 31, 2023). ↑
- The Ute Mountain Ute Tribe and the State of Colorado Gaming Compact, supra note 203, at 2. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, Specialized Bus. Grp., Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, Colorado Sports Betting Proceeds: October 2024 (2024), https://sbg.colorado.gov/sites/sbg/files/documents/54%20Monthly%20Summary%20%28October%20%2724%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KJN-ZGTK] (showing Colorado casinos generated $39,686,820.50 in gross gaming revenues from online sports betting in October 2024 alone). ↑
- Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453, 486 (2018). ↑
- H.R. 4308, 117th Cong. § 3 (2021). ↑
- Id. ↑
- Id. ↑
- Carleton, supra note 189, at 92. ↑
- See supra note 190 and accompanying text. ↑
- 25 C.F.R. § 293.26 (2025). ↑