University of Colorado Law Review

The Colorado Uniform Partnership Act (“CUPA”) contains a subtle shortcoming. CUPA is a default statute that only operates in the absence of a governing agreement between two partners formed at the outset of the partnership. As with most things in this life, partnerships inevitably come to an end. When this happens, a partner is said to have “dissociated” from the partnership. Typically, this is followed by a dissolution of the partnership itself. Rather than terminating at that point, the partnership then goes into what is Continue reading →

Two married couples decide to have a child via artificial reproduction. One parent in each couple will carry and give birth to the child. The other parent has no biological relationship with the child. One is an opposite-sex couple. Because they are married, they know that the father will automatically be considered the legal father. But the other couple is a lesbian couple. Leading up to the birth, the lesbian couple seeks out a lawyer and expresses concern regarding the nonbiological parent’s legal status. Because Continue reading →

The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Stoddard confronted a landmine of criminal and socioeconomic justice issues when it held that mandatory minimum sentences for drug conspiracy offenses should be imposed based on the amount of drugs attributable to the individual defendant (the individualized approach) as opposed to the amount of drugs attributable to the conspiracy as a whole (the conspiracy-wide approach). This decision reflects a nationwide circuit split implicating the courts and lawmakers’ ideological balancing of the issues of justice, liberty, public safety, and Continue reading →

In the field of conflict of laws, private actors are generally granted the power to choose the law to govern their contracts. This is the doctrine of party autonomy. In recent years, this doctrine has been the subject of several excellent histories that draw upon judicial opinions, scholarly writings, and legislative enactments to chronicle changing attitudes toward party autonomy over time. A moment’s reflection, however, reveals that judges, scholars, and legislatures are not the most important actors in this story. The true protagonists are the Continue reading →

Eighty-three years after the Dust Bowl, residents of America’s High Plains face a dire threat: their primary aquifer faces depletion, and entire sections of the country are set to run out of groundwater by the end of the century or sooner. The Ogallala Aquifer provides a significant amount of America’s agricultural irrigation water and is a primary source of drinking water for Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. This Article argues that policymakers should slow the Aquifer’s depletion rate by Continue reading →

The pro bono interests of law firm lawyers tend to differ from the actual legal needs of the poor. This difference results in the mismatch problem or the incongruence between the interests of firm lawyers and the needs of the poor. Today, the mismatch problem has resulted in law firm lawyers’ increased demand of immigration matters while legal needs are greatest in housing and family law. This leaves nonprofit legal services organizations scrambling to find pro bono representation for poor clients or otherwise relying on Continue reading →

The battle lines are drawn on the permissibility and validity of so-called “nationwide” injunctions—injunctions in federal constitutional litigation purporting to halt government enforcement of a challenged law[2] against all possible targets of that law and to protect all rights holders against enforcement, not only the parties to the action. Courts are divided—some granting,[3] with attempts at justification,[4] others rejecting, in practice if not in concept.[5] Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have weighed in against them.[6] Scholars supporting their validity[7] and scholars rejecting them as impermissible[8] have Continue reading →

Opponents of nationwide injunctions have advanced cogent reasons why courts should be skeptical of this sweeping remedy, but one of the arguments is a red herring: the constitutional objection. This Essay focuses on the narrow question of whether the Article III judicial power prohibits nationwide injunctions. It doesn’t. This Essay confronts and dispels the two most plausible arguments that nationwide injunctions run afoul of Article III. First, it shows that standing jurisprudence does not actually speak to the scope-of-remedy questions that nationwide injunctions present. Second, Continue reading →

And some things that should not have been forgotten were lost. History became legend. Legend became myth. –Lord of the Rings[2] Introduction When someone successfully sues a federal executive branch official for violating federal law, the federal court’s remedy, which can be a nationwide national government injunction, thrusts the court into controversial territory. Critics maintain that courts grant too many broad nationwide injunctions against the executive branch. They state a myriad of reasons to oppose nationwide injunctions: The federal court, they write, lacks authority, power, Continue reading →

Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others . . . . –W.E.B. DuBois[2] I start this piece with a personal narrative because I grew up in a family of storytellers. Even the story behind my name is part of who I am, and how I think, as a legal scholar. My parents chose my first name as a mixture of an homage to the cars that my mechanic dad worked on, loves, and has sometimes owned, and of Continue reading →